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TOMORROW’S INHERITANCE: THE 
FRONTIERS OF ESTATE PLANNING 
FORMALISM 
DAVID HORTON* 
Abstract: The rules that govern the creation of an estate plan are in flux. 
Courts once demanded strict adherence to the Wills Act. Yet, this legacy of 
hyper-vigilance is waning, as the Uniform Probate Code, the Restatement 
(Third) of Property, and ten states have adopted the harmless error rule. 
Meanwhile, trusts, which need not comply with the Wills Act, have eclipsed 
wills as the dominant method of posthumous wealth transmission. This Article 
explores three budding topics that threaten to further complicate this area. 
First, there are anecdotal accounts of decedents trying to make electronic 
wills. In both strict compliance and harmless error jurisdictions, e-wills raise 
thorny issues about the meaning of “signed” and “writing” in the Wills Act, 
and when, if ever, courts should be able to overlook violations of the statute. 
Second, despite the received wisdom that trusts are less formal than wills, a 
rising number of settlors are failing to observe the arcane principles that gov-
ern the transfer of property into a trust. Third, most state legislatures have 
adopted or are currently considering statutes that give fiduciaries access to the 
contents of a decedent’s email, text messaging, and social media accounts. But 
the precise steps necessary to convey these cutting-edge forms of property af-
ter death is unclear. This Article tries to help courts and policymakers regulate 
these matters by offering a fresh perspective on the purpose of mechanical, 
bright-line principles in the realm of estate planning. As conventionally 
framed, this debate revolves around what the Article calls the “intent para-
digm”: the idea that execution doctrines should be gauged primarily by 
whether they facilitate or frustrate the wishes of individual decedents. Con-
versely, this Article explores a different virtue of formalism: its ability to pre-
vent decedents from imposing spillover costs. This Article demonstrates how 
some unyielding principles limit the burden on courts, survivors, trustees, the 
trustee’s creditors, purchasers of trust property, and other third parties. It then 
explains how recognizing this anti-externality function can pay dividends in 
wills law, trust law, and emerging niches such as the inheritability of digital 
assets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2012, Javier Castro was admitted to the Mercy Regional 
Medical Center in Lorain, Ohio, where he learned that he would die without 
a blood transfusion.1 But Javier, a devout Jehovah’s Witness, refused the 
procedure.2 As he lay in his hospital bed, he dictated his last wishes to his 
brothers, Miguel and Albie.3 Miguel recorded Javier’s thoughts on a Sam-
sung Galaxy tablet computer using a stylus (an electronic pen).4 Then, with 
Miguel and Albie watching, Javier used the stylus to subscribe his name at 
the foot of the document.5 Miguel, Albie, and Javier’s nephew Oscar signed 
as witnesses.6 After Javier passed away, his brothers lodged a printout of the 
word processing file in probate court and argued that it was a valid will.7 
Javier Castro’s Electronic Will 
                                                                                                                           
 1 In re Estate of Javier Castro, No. 2013ES00140 (Lorain Cnty. Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 19, 
2013); Brad Dicken, Judge Rules That a Will Written and Signed on Tablet Is Legal, THE CHRON. 
(Elyria) (June 25, 2013), http://chronicle.northcoastnow.com/2013/06/25/judge-rules-will-written-
signed-on-tablet-is-legal/ [https://perma.cc/HJ49-FVD6]. 
 2 In re Estate of Javier Castro, No. 2013ES00140; Dicken, supra note 1. 
 3 In re Estate of Javier Castro, No. 2013ES00140. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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* * * * 
In 2004, Marcia Buyle signed a revocable living trust, naming herself 
as trustee and lifetime beneficiary and leaving her estate to her descendants 
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after she died.8 In addition, because trusts require a res—some possession 
for the trustee to manage—Marcia conveyed two parcels of land from her-
self as an individual to herself as trustee of the 2004 trust.9 Unfortunately, 
Marcia then had a disagreement with her grandson John.10 She executed a 
new trust in 2007 that disinherited him.11 Five years later, she passed 
away.12 
Marcia, however, had made a small but critical mistake. When Marcia 
tried to fund her 2007 trust, she had mimicked the process she had followed 
in 2004 and deeded her real estate from herself as an individual to herself as 
trustee.13 Nevertheless, as a California trial court observed, it was Marcia as 
trustee of the 2004 trust—not Marcia herself—who owned these assets: 
Marcia Buyle did not hold title to the property as an individual, at 
the time the 2007 property assignment and [d]eclaration of [t]rust 
were executed. To the contrary, she only held bare title in a fidu-
ciary capacity as trustee of the 2004 Trust  . . . . [A]s trustee of the 
2004 [t]rust, she could not validly transfer the subject property by 
means of the later execution of the written declarations and as-
signments in her individual name.14 
Because Marcia’s 2007 trust contained no property, it never came into ex-
istence.15 Thus, despite abundant evidence of Marcia’s wishes, the 2004 
trust governed, and John received a generous share of her estate.16 
* * * * 
Lance Corporal Justin Ellsworth was fresh out of high school when he 
arrived in Fallujah, Iraq.17 At home in suburban Michigan, he had camou-
flaged his baby face by cultivating a thin beard and wearing a black cowboy 
hat, but clean-shaven in his military dress, he looked barely old enough to 
drive.18 As an engineer with the First Marine Expeditionary Force, his du-
                                                                                                                           
 8 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11, Andrusiak v. Buyle, No. C079412 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 
2016), 2016 WL 839293, at *11. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at *11–12. 
 12 Id. at *12. 
 13 Id. at *11–12. 
 14 Id. at *9–10 (emphasis omitted). 
 15 Id. at *10. 
 16 See id. 
 17 John Bebow, Dad Fights Yahoo for E-mail of Slain GI; Company Cites Need for Privacy, 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 2004, at A1. 
 18 See LANCE CORPORAL JUSTIN MARK ELLSWORTH, http://www.justinellsworth.net/ [https://
perma.cc/4S9D-RNEJ]. 
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ties included disarming homemade bombs and evacuating civilians from 
residential areas before firefights.19 
E-mails were Justin’s lifeline to the United States.20 He accessed the 
Internet from a café near the base where he was stationed.21 For weeks, he 
used prepaid phone cards to log onto his Yahoo! account and trade messag-
es and photographs with his father, John, and his sister, Jessica.22 In addi-
tion to correspondence with his family, Justin’s inbox was full of notes from 
people he had never met: missives from strangers thanking him for his ser-
vice.23 Justin said that he wanted to make these exchanges into a scrapbook 
when he returned home.24 
In November 2004, Justin was killed while trying to defuse a roadside 
bomb.25 He received a posthumous Bronze Star for his bravery.26 Michigan’s 
governor ordered flags in the state to be lowered to half-mast.27 Justin’s com-
rades held a memorial for him in Iraq, and his hometown of Mount Pleasant 
organized an event with speakers, patriotic music, and a twelve-gun salute.28 
Yet in one way, honoring Justin proved difficult. As the personal repre-
sentative of Justin’s estate, John sought access to Justin’s email account to 
fulfill Justin’s wish of preserving his time overseas.29 Yahoo!, however, re-
jected John’s request.30 The company argued that when Justin had signed up 
for the service, he had agreed to their customer agreement that states that 
“any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate up-
on your death.”31 A company spokesperson argued that this hardline stance 
was necessary to maintain its customers’ privacy: “The commitment we’ve 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Bebow, supra note 17. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Anick Jesdanun, Who Inherits the E-mail?; Media: Dispute Over Dead Marine’s Account 
Exemplifies New Privacy Issue, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Dec. 26, 2004, at A24. 
 24 Ariana Eunjung Cha, After Death, a Struggle for Their Digital Memories, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 3, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58836-2005Feb2_3.html [https://
perma.cc/Q6N8-SCVH]. 
 25 See Bebow, supra note 17. 
 26 See Jennifer Chambers, Bronze Star for Fallen Marine Stirs Proud Dad, DETROIT NEWS, 
Mar. 1, 2005, http://www.justinellsworth.net/articles/detroit%20news%201mar05.htm [https://perma.
cc/9WWU-RGZS]. 
 27 See Jeffrey Zaslow, Is Standard Slipping for Lowering the Flag?, SEATTLE TIMES, July 4, 
2006, at A3. 
 28 Dean Bohn, Former Marine Plans Ellsworth Memorial, SAGINAW NEWS, Nov. 20, 2004, at 
7A; Sgt. Luis R. Agostini, Bronze Star Goes to Self-Sacrificing Engineer, http://www.
justinellsworth.net/articles/apr05.htm [https://perma.cc/Z338-8DWH]. 
 29 Jeffrey Zaslow, Efforts Mount to Preserve Soldiers’ Letters and Emails, NAPLES DAILY 
NEWS, May 8, 2005, at D13. 
 30 Cha, supra note 24. 
 31 Bebow, supra note 17. 
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made to every person who signs up for a Yahoo Mail account is to treat their 
e-mail as . . . confidential.”32 
John responded by filing a lawsuit, asking the court to hold that Jus-
tin’s emails, like everything else Justin owned, were inheritable.33 
* * * * 
Few issues in the field of decedents’ estates are as unsettled as the 
steps necessary to transmit property after death. Once, most people made 
wills.34 As a result, they needed to comply with the Wills Act: an ancient 
statue that requires testamentary dispositions to be written, signed by the 
testator, and subscribed by two people who, present at the same time, saw 
the testator sign the document or acknowledge her signature.35 Courts in-
sisted on strict compliance with these directives.36 They struck down pur-
ported wills for trivial mistakes, spawning a vast caselaw that was “notori-
ous for its harsh and relentless formalism.”37 
In two celebrated articles published in the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, Ashbel Gulliver, Catherine Tilson, and Lon Fuller offered a qualified 
defense of the Wills Act formalities.38 In an insight that has been cited hun-
dreds of times, the scholars argued that the statute’s elements serve several 
important goals. They contended that the writing and signature prongs pro-
vide concrete proof of the testator’s wishes (the “evidentiary function”),39 
the ceremonial nature of the process reinforces its solemnity (the “ritual 
function”),40 attestation by witnesses shields the testator from fraud and un-
due influence (the “protective function”),41 and, together, these features 
shoehorn wills into a standardized format that is familiar to testators, law-
yers, and judges (the “channeling function”).42 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Cha, supra note 24. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Suc-
cession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984). 
 35 See Wills Act 1837, 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 (Eng.). 
 36 E.g., In re James’ Estate, 198 A. 4, 5 (Pa. 1938). 
 37 John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 
(1975). 
 38 See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941); 
Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 
(1941). 
 39 Fuller, supra note 38, at 800; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 6–9. 
 40 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 5–6; see Fuller, supra note 38, at 800 (calling this the 
“cautionary” function). 
 41 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 9–13. 
 42 Fuller, supra note 38, at 801–03. 
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Yet starting in the 1970s, a parade of scholars argued that slavish adher-
ence to formality frustrates—rather than facilitates—a decedent’s intent.43 
These critics urged judges to read the Wills Act purposively, not textually.44 
They explained that a document can be executed under circumstances that 
satisfy the statute’s ambitions and yet defy its plain language.45 As these func-
tionalists rose in the academy and took the helm of prominent law reform 
projects, their vision began to bear fruit. Within the last two decades, the Uni-
form Probate Code, the Restatement (Third) of Property, and ten American 
jurisdictions have adopted a novel rule called harmless error that empowers 
judges to enforce a failed attempt to make a will if there is clear and convinc-
ing evidence that a decedent wanted it to be effective.46 
Meanwhile, a revolution in estate planning diminished the importance 
of the Wills Act. Non-probate devices such as revocable living trusts have 
eclipsed wills.47 Although trusts serve the same purpose as wills—in fact, 
they are commonly called “will substitutes”—they do not need to be signed, 
witnessed, or, in some cases, even written.48 Indeed, trusts can be implied 
by conduct or created in instruments that “do[] not use the word ‘trust.’”49 
The widespread use of these tools has simultaneously constricted the do-
main of the Wills Act and made its demands seem extravagant. 
This Article explores three emerging issues that straddle these fault 
lines. The first is electronic wills such as Javier Castro’s.50 Given our wired 
and digitized society, it is not surprising that decedents are trying to craft 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 202 (1989); John H. 
Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil 
Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (1987); Langbein, supra note 37, at 
489–503; James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 
543 (1990); Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 
WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 49 (1985). 
 44 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 37, at 498–99. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503 (2016); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-503 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2016); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 72-2-523 (2016); N.J. STAN. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2107.24 (LexisNexis 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
2-503 (LexisNexis 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2016); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
 47 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 34, at 1109–15. 
 48 See, e.g., Fahrney v. Wilson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1960) (recognizing an oral 
trust of the proceeds of a life insurance policy); Langbein, supra note 34, at 1109. 
 49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 24 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
 50 See infra notes 186–254. For ease of reference, this Article will use the phrases “electronic 
will,” “e-will,” or “digital will” although it is not clear whether these instruments actually are 
valid wills. 
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testamentary dispositions on laptops and mobile devices.51 Some countries, 
such as Australia, adopted the harmless error rule decades ago, and have a 
burgeoning body of law on digital wills.52 Yet, in the United States, there is 
very little authority or scholarship on point.53 One jurisdiction, Nevada, val-
idates electronic wills by statute.54 Nevertheless, the only reported Ameri-
can case is Javier Castro’s.55 Although an Ohio trial judge in that matter 
applied the harmless error rule to enforce the writing on the tablet computer, 
the probate was not contested, and it is unclear what the outcome would 
have been in a different procedural posture.56 
Second, courts have begun to encounter an unexpected problem: trust 
formalism.57 Because trusts are exempt from the Wills Act, trust creation has 
not received sustained scholarly attention.58 Nevertheless, to transfer property 
into a trust, a settlor must comply with arcane rules from the world of deeds 
and gifts.59 Indeed, Marcia Buyle’s trust failed because she failed to write two 
words on a piece of paper.60 Unfortunately, Marcia’s case is no aberration. As 
trusts have become mainstream, many would-be settlors are creating “phan-
tom” trusts (those that contain no property and do not exist) 61 and “incom-
                                                                                                                           
 51 See infra notes 186–254. 
 52 See, e.g., Estate of Currie [2015] NSWLR 1098 (Austl.); Estate of Yu [2013] Qd R 322 
(Austl.); Yazbek v. Yazbek, [2012] NSWLR 594 (Austl.); Mahlo v. Hehir [2011] Qd R 243 
(Austl.). 
 53 See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for 
Wills to Join the Digital Revolution?, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 865, 865 (2007); Scott S. Boddery, 
Electronic Wills: Drawing a Line in the Sand Against Their Validity, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. 
L.J. 197, 198 (2012); Jasmine Banks, Comment, Turning a Won’t into a Will: Revisiting Will 
Formalities and E-Filing as Permissible Solutions for Electronic Wills in Texas, 8 EST. PLAN. & 
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 291, 292 (2015); Christopher J. Caldwell, Comment, Should “E-Wills” 
Be Wills: Will Advances in Technology Be Recognized for Will Execution?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 
467, 467–68 (2002); Gökalp Y. Gürer, Note, No Paper? No Problem: Ushering in Electronic 
Wills Through California’s “Harmless Error” Provision, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1955, 1957–59 
(2016). 
 54 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2016). 
 55 See In re Estate of Javier Castro, No. 2013ES00140.  
 56 See id. 
 57 See infra notes 301–374 and accompanying text. 
 58 Thus far, the only extended scholarly treatment of trust formation appears in Jane B. Baron, 
The Trust Res and Donative Intent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 45 (1986). Baron analyzes trusts that are 
invalid because the would-be settlor does not clearly “identify which of several similar items such 
as bonds or bank accounts . . . constitute[s] the subject matter of the trust.” Id. at 46–47. Converse-
ly, this Article deals with a different way in which trusts fail for a lack of property: the growing 
number of cases in which settlors are crystal clear about their desire to transfer particular rights or 
items into the trust, but get tripped up by esoteric rules such as the delivery requirement or the 
statute of frauds. See infra notes 258–270 and accompanying text. 
 59 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 16 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 60 See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 301–346 and accompanying text. 
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plete trusts” (which only include some of the assets that they were designed 
to contain).62 
Third, there has been intense interest in the inheritability of digital as-
sets such as Justin Ellsworth’s Yahoo! messages.63 Americans spend an av-
erage of twenty-three hours per week texting or on the web.64 Each minute, 
users add 600 videos to YouTube, create 320 Twitter handles, and post 6600 
images to Flickr.65 With Instagram, Shutterfly, and Tumblr replacing the 
family photo album, and Facebook attracting a rising number of senior citi-
zens, lawmakers have begun trying to regulate this nexus of technology and 
death.66 
The path has been bumpy. In 2014, the Uniform Law Commission 
(“ULC”) promulgated the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act 
(“UFADDA”), which makes e-mail and social media accounts inheritable 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See infra notes 301–346 and accompanying text. 
 63 See, e.g., Natalie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in Distrib-
uting or Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 799–800 (2014); Naomi 
Cahn, Probate Law Meets the Digital Age, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1698–1702 (2014); James D. 
Lamm, et al., The Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries 
from Managing Digital Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 385–87 (2014); Jason Mazzone, 
Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1644–45 (2012); Sandi S. Varnado, Your Digital 
Footprint Left Behind at Death: An Illustration of Technology Leaving the Law Behind, 74 LA. L. 
REV. 719, 719–26 (2014); Elizabeth D. Barwick, Note, All Blogs Go to Heaven: Preserving Valu-
able Digital Assets Without the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act’s Removal of 
Third Party Privacy Protections, 50 GA. L. REV. 593, 595–99 (2016); Matt Borden, Note, Cover-
ing Your Digital Assets: Why the Stored Communications Act Stands in the Way of Digital Inher-
itance, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 407–08 (2014); Matthew W. Costello, Note, The “PEAC” of Digital 
Estate Legislation in the United States: Should States “Like” That?, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 429, 
429–32 (2016); Jeehyeon Lee, Death and Live Feeds: Privacy Protection in Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Assets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 654, 659–63; Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Hap-
pens to Our Facebook Accounts When We Die?: Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-
Media Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 186–90 (2012); Elizabeth Sy, Comment, The 
Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act: Has the Law Caught up with Technolo-
gy?, 32 TOURO L. REV. 647, 647–50 (2016); Molly Wilkens, Note, Privacy and Security During 
Life, Access After Death: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1037, 1038–42 (2011); 
infra 376–437 notes and accompanying text. 
 64 David Mielach, Americans Spend 23 Hours Per Week Online, Texting, BUS. NEWS DAILY 
(July 2, 2013), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4718-weekly-online-social-media-time.html 
[https://perma.cc/L5NK-84ZY]. 
 65 Sasha A. Klein & Mark R. Parthemer, #Where Are Our Family Photos?!? Planning for 
Digital Legacy, PROB. & PROP. MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2015, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
probate_property_magazine_2012/2015/january_february_2015/2015_aba_rpte_pp_v29_1_article_
klein_parthemer_planning_for_digital_legacy.html [https://perma.cc/E74J-HEJL]. 
 66 Aaron Smith, Older Adults and Technology Use, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2014), http://
www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/03/older-adults-and-technology-use/ [https://perma.cc/UY7V-J8WW]; 
see Heidi Glenn, In the Digital Age, the Family Photo Album Fades Away, NPR (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/07/25/205425676/preserving-family-photos-
in-digital-age [https://perma.cc/MEZ7-XNRJ]. 
2017] Estate Planning Formalism 549 
unless a decedent provides otherwise in her estate plan.67 Yet an unholy alli-
ance of Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and civil liberties organizations 
objected to the draft statute.68 ISPs proposed their own rubric—the Privacy 
Expectation Afterlife and Choices Act (“PEAC”)—that forces decedents to 
transmit digital assets in a will.69 Then, in 2015, the ULC fired back by 
amending the UFADDA (“RUFADDA”).70 Since 2016, the RUFADDA has 
gained momentum, passing in twenty-one states and becoming the runaway 
majority approach.71 Nevertheless, the ULC’s handiwork honors directives 
in wills, trusts, and even unsigned writings,72 and thus raises thorny ques-
tions about informality in estate planning. 
When courts, commentators, and lawmakers tackle these nascent prob-
lems, they are likely to concentrate on a single question: whether mechani-
cal, bright-line rules promote or impede a decedent’s wishes. From Gulliver, 
Tilson, and Fuller to the proponents of the harmless error rule, the debate 
over testamentary formalism has revolved largely around this issue, which 
this Article calls the “intent paradigm.” At first, its laser-like focus appears 
to make perfect sense. Honoring a testator or settlor’s preferences is nothing 
less than “[t]he organizing principle of the American law of succession.”73 
Indeed, “the intention of the [decedent] is of primary importance, the lode-
star, cornerstone, [and] cardinal rule.”74 Thus, it seems only natural that the 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT (“UFADDA”) § 3 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2014). 
 68 Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Suzanne Brown Walsh, Chair, Unif. Law 
Comm’n (July 3, 2013) [hereinafter “ACLU Letter”]. See generally PRIVACY EXPECTATION AF-
TERLIFE AND CHOICES ACT (“PEAC”) (NETCHOICE 2015) 
 69 See PEAC § 1(B)(c)(i).  
 70 See generally REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT 
(“RUFADDA”) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). 
 71 See S.B. 1413, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016); S.B. 88, 71st Gen. Assemb. (Colo. 
2016); H.B. 5606, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2016); S.B. 494, Gen. Assemb. (Fla. 2016); S.B. 2298, 
28th Leg. (Haw. 2016); S.B. 1303, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2016); H.B. 4648, Gen. Assemb. 
(Ill. 2016); S.B. 253, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016); S.B. 239, Legis. Sess. (Md. 
2015); H.B. 5034, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016); H.B. 200, 89th Sess. (Minn. 2016); Legis. 
B. 829, 104th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2016); Assemb. B. 9910 (N.Y. 2016); S.B. 805, Gen. Assemb. 
(N.C. 2016); S.B. 1554, 78th Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2016), S.B. 908, Gen. Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C. 
2016); S.B. 326, Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2015); S.B. 5029, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016); 
Assemb. B. 695, 102nd Leg. (Wisc. 2016); S.B. 34, 63rd Leg. (Wyo. 2016); see also Linn Foster 
Freedman, California Passes Digital Assets Law, ROBINSON+COLE (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.
dataprivacyandsecurityinsider.com/2016/08/california-passes-digital-assets-law/ [https://perma.cc/
8PUC-7D46]. 
 72 See RUFADDA § 7(4). 
 73 Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 643, 643 (2014); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The main function of the law in this field is to facili-
tate rather than regulate.”). 
 74 In re Estate of Janney, 446 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 1982). 
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debate over the Wills Act and its non-probate analogues would revolve 
around how well these rules serve the wishes of individual owners. 
Conversely, this Article seeks to expand understanding of a different 
way in which formalism can be socially valuable. It claims that immutable 
principles do not just impact testators and settlors; rather, they also affect 
third parties. For instance, requiring wills to be memorialized in conven-
tional formats spares courts from resolving complex disputes and simplifies 
the process of identifying a decedent’s dispositive instruments. Similarly, 
trust formalism clarifies whether assets belong to a settlor or her trust, mak-
ing life easier for trustees, creditors, and prospective buyers of trust proper-
ty. Finally, restricting the posthumous transfer of electronic assets liberates 
ISPs from administrative costs and protects the privacy of people who have 
connected online with a decedent. These are examples of what this Article 
calls the “anti-externality” function of testamentary formalism.75 
This Article explains how this insight can pay dividends in the three 
debates mentioned above.76 For starters, the status of digital wills is uncer-
tain because these brave new instruments trigger a lurking issue about the 
scope of the harmless error doctrine. States disagree about whether harm-
less error can forgive any failure to comply with the Wills Act, or whether 
some of the statute’s elements are still mandatory.77 Computer and 
smartphone wills fall right into this doctrinal quicksand, because they may 
not qualify as “signed writings.”78 As a result, even in harmless error states, 
the validity of digital wills depends on which formalities are merely aspira-
tional (capable of being relaxed in appropriate cases) and which are indis-
pensable. The intent paradigm offers little guidance on this choice, because 
its logic dictates that no formality should ever trump compelling evidence 
that a decedent wanted an electronic file to be her will. On the other hand, 
the anti-externality theory can be the springboard for a more nuanced policy 
prescription. It reveals that maintaining pockets of pure formalism—such as 
requiring wills to be inscribed on paper or signed in ink—serves as a bul-
wark against spillover costs. 
Similarly, the anti-externality theory provides a richer understanding of 
trust formalism. Settlors create phantom and incomplete trusts by either 
failing to re-title assets, deliver the property to the trustee, or obtain the 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See infra notes 272–298 and accompanying text. 
 76 Formalities necessary to create or update other popular forms of posthumous wealth trans-
mission, such as life insurance or pension accounts, are outside the scope of this Article. For an 
excellent discussion of these issues, see Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie, Accidental Inher-
itance: Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 200–12 
(2014). 
 77 See infra notes 161–185 and accompanying text. 
 78 See infra notes 235–254 and accompanying text. 
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trustee’s signature.79 Seen through the prism of the intent paradigm, this is 
empty formalism; there is never doubt about what the settlor was trying to 
accomplish. Yet broadening the scope of the inquiry to include the interests 
of third parties changes the normative calculus. Trust formalities encourage 
transparency about ownership, which helps trustees understand the scope of 
their duties and third parties avoid liability for participating in a breach of 
trust.80 Factoring the rights of outsiders into the equation allows judges to 
maintain a level of necessary formality while excusing some trust-formation 
mistakes as harmless. 
Finally, negative externalities are front and center in the debate over 
digital assets. The UFADDA, the PEAC, and the RUFADDA vary in their 
levels of concern about electronic inheritance harming third parties.81 The 
PEAC is preoccupied with shielding ISPs from transaction costs and main-
taining the confidentiality of people whose messages and media may be 
embedded in a decedent’s account.82 Thus, it uses formalism in a novel 
way: as a bludgeon to discourage a particular type of posthumous convey-
ance. Conversely, the UFADDA and the RUFADDA are much more sanguine 
about these concerns, and go to great lengths to honor informal dispositions.83 
This Article argues that none of these rubrics gets the balance exactly right. 
Part I of this Article provides background by tracing the history of 
formalism in wills and trusts law.84 It demonstrates that contradictions 
plague the rules that govern the creation of an estate plan. Parts II through 
IV examine three topics that threaten to amplify this confusion: electronic 
wills, phantom and incomplete trusts, and digital assets.85 Two rough 
themes unite these Parts. First, the dominant way of analyzing formality 
problems—the intent paradigm—is too narrow. Second, stepping back to 
consider the interests of third parties both explains puzzling features of the 
law and illuminates the path for reform. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TESTAMENTARY FORMALISM 
The doctrines that govern the creation of an estate plan are conflicting 
and contested. To make this point concrete, consider two recent cases. 
In 2004, Thomas Grady Chastain, a resident of Polk County, Tennes-
see, created a two-page, typewritten document naming his daughter as ex-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See infra notes 309–334 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 360–369 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 398–419 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 420–429 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 432–437 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 86–185 and accompanying text. 
 85 See infra notes 186–437 and accompanying text. 
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ecutor and leaving most of his property to her.86 Thomas printed his name in 
the first paragraph, establishing that he intended this instrument to be his 
will.87 Thomas and three witnesses also initialed at the bottom of the first 
page.88 Although the witnesses signed in the proper spaces on the second 
page, however, Thomas did not.89 Instead, Thomas accidentally subscribed 
an attached affidavit in which he and the witnesses swore under penalty of 
perjury that the document was Thomas’s will.90 
Excerpts from Thomas Chastain’s Purported Will and Affidavit 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See In re Estate of Chastain, 401 S.W.3d 612, 614 (Tenn. 2012). 
 87 See id. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. at 614–15. 
 90 See id. at 615. 
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In 2012, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Thomas did not create 
a valid disposition of his property.91 In Tennessee, as in most other states, 
the Wills Act provides that a testamentary instrument must be (1) in writing, 
(2) signed by the testator, and (3) attested by two people who were present 
at the same time when they saw the testator sign the will or acknowledge 
her signature.92 Against this unforgiving backdrop, Thomas’s efforts fell 
short. As the Tennessee justices explained, although Thomas had authenti-
cated the document multiple times, he had only signed the affidavit, which 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See id. at 620–22. 
 92 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104 (2016); cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(1) (West 
2016) (adding the requirement that the witnesses sign “during the testator’s lifetime”). The Uni-
form Probate Code and some states require writing and signature but allow the witnesses to sign at 
separate moments. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-502 (2016); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
502(a)(3)(A) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended 2013). 
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is “not part of the [w]ill.”93 Thus, his possessions passed through intestacy, 
rather than to his daughter.94 
In 2013, Karter Yu, an international student living in Australia, com-
mitted suicide.95 Just before Karter took his own life, he used the Notes ap-
plication on his iPhone to create a file that began with “[t]his is the last Will 
and Testament.”96 He named his brother Jason as executor and divided his 
property among his loved ones.97 He then “signed” his name by typing it 
with his fingers.98 The Queensland Supreme Court applied the harmless 
error rule and enforced the Notes file.99 
The discord between these holdings could hardly be starker. Thomas’s 
wishes were thwarted even though he took pains to memorialize them. 
Karter’s desires were honored although he rattled them off in the fashion 
that one might make a grocery list. How can a single body of law be capa-
ble of such extremes? 
This Part answers that question by tracing the arc of testamentary for-
malism. It starts by describing the Wills Act. It then explains how the non-
probate revolution and the harmless error rule have transformed the rules 
that govern the creation of an estate plan into a patchwork of inconsistency. 
A. The Wills Act 
The seeds of the Wills Act were sown in seventeenth century England. 
During this time, the process for determining title to real estate was in disar-
ray.100 Phony sales of land—especially land that the seller claimed to have 
inherited—were endemic.101 To clamp down on this practice, Parliament 
passed the statute of frauds in 1677. This legislation mandated that wills 
conveying real property “shall be in writing, and signed by the [testator] . . . 
and shall be attested and subscribed, in the presence of the [testator] by 
three or four credible witnesses.”102 The last prong—attestation—separated 
wills from gifts and contracts, which do not need to be witnessed. 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See In re Estate of Chastain, 401 S.W.3d at 620. 
 94 See id. at 620–22. 
 95 Estate of Yu [2013] Qd R 322 ¶ 1. 
 96 Estate of Yu [2013] Qd R 322 ¶ 9; iPhone Will Found Valid in QLD Supreme Court, CHAM-
BERLAINS, http://www.chamberlains.com.au/iphone-will-found-valid-qld-supreme-court/ [https://
perma.cc/X3Q4-H5A8]. 
 97 Estate of Yu [2013] Qd R 322 ¶ 7. 
 98 Id. ¶ 9. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, The Conveyancing Purposes of the Statute of Frauds, 27 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 354, 355 (1983). 
 101 See id. at 356. 
 102 Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 3, § 5 (Eng.). 
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Then, in 1837, the Wills Act extended the statute of frauds to disposi-
tions of both real and personal property.103 Although the new law reduced 
the number of witnesses to two, it also added a new condition: these indi-
viduals had to be “present at the same time” when they saw the testator sign 
her will or acknowledge an existing signature.104 These rigorous require-
ments migrated along with British colonists throughout the world, including 
to the United States and Australia.105 
Courts implemented the Wills Act with iron hands. They reasoned that 
staunch adherence to the writing, signature, and attestation requirements 
was necessary to effectuate a decedent’s intent: 
The purpose of the statutory requirements with respect to the exe-
cution of wills [i]s to throw every safeguard deemed necessary 
around a testator while in the performance of this important act, 
and to prevent the probate of a fraudulent and supposititious will 
instead of the real one. To . . . accomplish this, the statute must be 
strictly followed.106 
Thus, judges struck down purported wills for trivial defects: when a dece-
dent had signed the instrument in the wrong place107 or failed to 
acknowledge the document to both witnesses,108 when the parties signed in 
the wrong order,109 or when a witness did not understand that she was sign-
ing a will.110 
In 1941, Gulliver, Tilson, and Fuller explored these austere-seeming 
results.111 They argued that the Wills Act formalities are valuable because 
they generate trustworthy proof of the testator’s wishes (the “evidentiary 
function”).112 By the time that litigation rears its head, the testator will be 
dead and the court must glean her desires through interested parties’ testi-
                                                                                                                           
 103 See Wills Act 1837, 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 (Eng.). 
 104 See id. § 9. 
 105 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 226–27 (8th ed. 
2009). See generally Wills Act of 1936 (SA) (Austl.). 
 106 Savage v. Bowen, 49 S.E. 668, 669 (Va. 1905). 
 107 See, e.g., In re Schiele’s Estate, 51 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1951); Succession of Hoyt, 303 
So. 2d 189, 189 (La. Ct. App. 1974); In re Glace’s Estate, 196 A.2d 297, 300 (Pa. 1964). 
 108 See, e.g., In re Krause’s Estate, 117 P.2d 1, 1–2 (Cal. 1941); In re Mackay’s Will, 18 N.E. 
433, 434 (N.Y. 1888). 
 109 See, e.g., Chase v. Kittredge, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 49, 63 (1865). 
 110 See, e.g., In re Foster’s Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (Sur. Ct. 1949). 
 111 See Fuller, supra note 38; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38. Although Gulliver and Tilson 
analyzed the Wills Act in depth, Fuller was primarily concerned with the contract doctrine of 
consideration. Fuller, supra note 38, at 799–804; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 5–13. 
 112 Fuller, supra note 38, at 800; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 6–7. 
556 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:539 
mony and documents that may be decades old.113 Thus, the writing and sig-
nature prongs ensure that “testamentary intent [is] . . . cast in reliable and 
permanent form.”114 
In addition, the three authors noted that the rites of testation reinforce 
its gravity.115 Because a will can be revoked or amended until death, there is 
a risk that testators will act rashly. Thus, the fanfare of a signed and wit-
nessed writing “act[s] as a check against inconsiderate action.”116 Gulliver 
and Tilson called this the “ritual function,” whereas Fuller referred to it as 
the “cautionary function.”117 
Gulliver and Tilson also noted that the attestation mandate could, theo-
retically, shield testators from deceit and undue influence (the “protective 
function”).118 Yet, they saw this idea as anachronistic. Indeed, they asserted 
that the witnessing component of the Wills Act was a hangover from the 
days when testators made wills on their deathbed and thus needed addition-
al armor against imposition.119 Because the protective function occupied the 
lowest rung on the totem pole, they concluded that attestation was “difficult 
to justify.”120 
Finally, Fuller briefly alluded to what he called the “channeling func-
tion.”121 As he put it, formalities “furnish[] a simple and external test of en-
forceability” by standardizing the physical appearance of a particular spe-
cies of legal instrument.122 Insignias like the seal that once infused a con-
tract with consideration make it easier for parties to telegraph their intent to 
enter into a binding transaction.123 
In sum, Gulliver, Tilson, and Fuller’s trailblazing work sought to ex-
plain how formalities furthered testamentary intent.124 Two decades after 
their articles appeared, however, a sea change in the mechanics of inher-
itance complicated matters. 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 6. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Fuller, supra note 38, at 800; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 5. 
 116 Fuller, supra note 38, at 800. 
 117 Id.; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 6. 
 118 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 9–13. 
 119 Id. at 10. 
 120 Id. at 9. 
 121 Fuller, supra note 38, at 801–03. 
 122 Id. at 801. 
 123 See id. 
 124 For an interesting argument that Gulliver and Tilson’s analysis merely synthesized existing 
law rather than breaking new ground, see generally Adam J. Hirsch, Gulliver and Tilson, ‘The 
Classification of Gratuitous Transfers’—A Belated Review, 35 U. QUEENSL. L. J. 127, 127 (2016). 
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B. The Non-Probate Revolution 
Wills are not the only means by which people can pass property at 
death. Since feudal times, individuals have also used trusts: a device that 
Frederic Maitland hailed as the “most distinctive achievement . . . in the 
field of jurisprudence.”125 A trust is a gift that elapses over time and thus 
needs ongoing administration.126 A settlor creates a trust by transferring 
property to a trustee, who owes a fiduciary duty to manage it for the benefi-
ciaries.127 
In 1965, an unlikely messiah stimulated interest in trusts as an estate-
planning tool. A mutual fund salesman named Norman Dacey self-published 
a book called How to Avoid Probate.128 Dacey argued that probate, in which a 
court oversees the estates of individuals who either made wills or died intes-
tate, was slow, unnecessary, and expensive.129 He urged his readers to bypass 
the process through a mechanism called the revocable living trust.130 
The trick that Dacey championed works like this. Probate only applies 
to assets that a person owns in his or her individual capacity.131 When a set-
tlor places property into a trust, it no longer belongs to him or her.132 In-
stead, it belongs to the trust.133 This is true even if the settlor retains vast 
power over the corpus by dictating the terms of the trust, serving as the ini-
tial trustee and beneficiary, and reserving the right to amend or terminate 
the trust.134 Ultimately, when the settlor dies, the property in the trust is not 
his or hers, and thus is not subject to probate.135 
Despite its esoteric subject matter, How to Avoid Probate became a 
runaway bestseller.136 It christened a movement called the non-probate 
                                                                                                                           
 125 F.W. MAITLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS 129 (H. D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936). 
 126 See, e.g., Bernard Rudden, Book Review, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610, 610–11 (1981) (calling a 
trust “a gift, projected on the plane of time and so subjected to a management regime”). 
 127 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
 128 NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE! (5th ed. 1993). 
 129 See id. at 23–36. 
 130 See id. at 44–50. 
 131 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1 
(AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
 132 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
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 134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1 cmt b 
(noting that, to trigger probate, “[a]ctual ownership, not ownership in substance, is required”). 
 135 See, e.g., Fehrs v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 65 T.C. 346, 347 (1975) (noting that when 
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 136 See Richard D. Lyons, Norman Dacey, 85; Advised His Readers to Avoid Probate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 19, 1994), http:// www.nytimes.com/1994/03/19/nyregion/norman-dacey-85-advised-
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revolution that made trusts, not wills, the default estate planning choice.137 
A lucrative trust-creation industry emerged, in which seasoned lawyers 
compete with do-it-yourself books, estate planning software, and “trust 
mills,” fly-by-night companies that are staffed by non-attorneys who sell 
low-quality, pre-printed trust instruments.138 In rising numbers, settlors are 
trying to create sophisticated dispositive arrangements “without aid of legal 
counsel.”139 
In addition, the rise of trusts created a deep rift at the core of the inher-
itance process. Trusts are indistinguishable from wills. Indeed, their entire 
purpose is to transmit an owner’s assets after death. Similar to wills, trusts 
need to obey certain formal rules. Because property is an essential ingredient 
of a valid trust, settlors must “fund” the mechanism by transferring the corpus 
to the trustee.140 Thus, when a settlor wants to place real property in trust, he 
or she has to satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires a signed writing.141 
Likewise, because the conveyance underlying a trust is a gift, the settlor bears 
the burden of delivering property to the trustee.142 Despite their functional 
equivalence to wills, however, trusts are exempt from the Wills Act.143 Thus, 
in sharp contrast to wills, witnesses never need to sign trusts.144 
In fact, the tension between the formalism of the Wills Act and the 
rules of trust formation runs even deeper. Settlors sometimes use a tech-
nique known as a “declaration” of trust. The hallmark of a declaration of 
trust is that the settlor names herself as the trustee.145 This streamlines the 
process of feeding property into a trust. Due to the absurdity of requiring 
the settlor to present herself with her own assets, declarations of trust do not 
require delivery.146 That means that a declaration of trust of personal prop-
erty is exempt from the Wills Act, the statute of frauds, and the delivery 
requirement. Accordingly, such a trust can arise in a fashion that is all but 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 34, at 1109, 1113; see also In re Marriage of Githens, 204 
P.3d 835, 848 (Or. 2009) (noting that “revocable trusts are now common will substitutes”). 
 138 See, e.g., David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1675, 1715–21 (2009). 
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 144 See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 43, at 545. 
 145 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 146 See, e.g., Milholland v. Whalen, 43 A. 43, 43–44 (Md. 1899). 
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invisible to the outside world. The settlor need only orally declare herself 
trustee or act as though she is trustee.147 This clandestine transfer could not 
be further from the demands of traditional wills law. 
Accordingly, the non-probate revolution made estate planning less 
formal. Although most settlors still executed written instruments, they never 
needed to sign them in front of two witnesses who were present at the same 
time. By comparison, the Wills Act seemed fussy and archaic. In fact, as 
explained next, this unflattering contrast rekindled discussions over formal-
ism in wills law. 
C. Harmless Error 
On the heels of the non-probate revolution, a new generation of aca-
demics turned their attention to the issue of will formation.148 Some of them 
sought to bring wills law in line with trust law by eliminating the attestation 
prong from the Wills Act.149 Others floated more ambitious ideas. For ex-
ample, John Langbein observed that the Wills Act, standing alone, was not 
unique; after all, the related fields of property and contract also contain sim-
ilar requirements, such as the statute of frauds and the consideration doc-
trine.150 Instead, Langbein argued, what truly made wills law remarkable 
was its lack of exceptions to these formal rules.151 Without an equivalent to 
the merchant confirmation or promissory estoppel doctrines, wills law had 
no palliative for the sting of the formalities.152 As Langbein put it, conven-
tional wills law was unusual not for “the prominence of the formalities, but 
the judicial insistence that any defect in complying with them automatically 
and inevitably voids the will.”153 Thus, Langbein suggested that courts be 
able to probate wills that substantially complied with the Wills Act.154 
In a later article, Langbein offered a different slant on the issue.155 In 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, several Australian provinces had adopted 
what was then called the “dispensing power,” but now is known as the 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 407 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (amended 2010). 
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harmless error rule.156 These statutes allow courts to enforce a failed at-
tempt to make a will if there is cogent evidence that a decedent intended it 
to be effective.157 Langbein argued that American lawmakers should take a 
page from their Australian counterparts.158 His proposal obtained a foothold 
with the 1990 revisions to the Uniform Probate Code and the 1999 Re-
statement (Third) of Property: Wills and Donative Transfers.159 These 
sources seek to give American probate judges the discretion to admit non-
compliant documents to probate: 
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not 
executed in compliance with [the Wills Act], the document or 
writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with 
that section if the proponent of the document or writing establish-
es by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended 
the document or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will .160 
Lurking beneath this overdue and intuitive reform is a layer of com-
plexity. Does harmless error give judges the freewheeling power to admit 
any statement of dispositive wishes into probate? Or should the doctrine 
continue to include pockets of bright-line principles? As ten states adopted 
harmless error,161 this question bubbled to the surface. Several of these ju-
risdictions chose to retain particular Wills Act elements as unqualified con-
ditions. For example, California’s harmless error statute governs flaws in 
the attestation process, but not those related to the writing or signature 
components.162 Colorado’s version applies “only if the document is signed 
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§ 2107.24 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (Lex-
isNexis 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2016). 
 162 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110. 
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or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will.”163 Likewise, Virginia’s 
law cannot “excuse compliance with any requirement for a testator’s signa-
ture.”164 Finally, legislation in Ohio still requires subscription from both the 
testator and two witnesses and barely seems like harmless error at all.165 
Even the scope of the UPC’s harmless error rule is contested. At first 
blush, the statute seems to mandate nothing more than the creation of a 
“document or writing”—a standard than can cure any flaw other than an 
allegedly oral will.166 Recent decisions from the UPC jurisdiction of New 
Jersey, however, cloud the picture. First, in Probate of Will and Codicil of 
Macool, Louise Macool made handwritten notes on a sheet of paper about 
amending her estate plan.167 She brought it to her lawyer, who discussed it 
with her and took notes on a Dictaphone.168 Based on this tape, the attor-
ney’s secretary created an instrument that differed in several small ways 
from Louise’s notes and was marked “rough.”169 Sadly, before Louise could 
schedule a meeting to sign the new will, she died.170 The trial court refused 
to apply harmless error, reasoning that the UPC requires a writing to be 
“signed in some fashion by the testator.”171 The appellate court affirmed on 
a different ground: that there was no evidence that Louise had ever seen—
much less given her imprimatur to—the draft will.172 Nevertheless, to pro-
vide clarity, the state justices repudiated the trial court’s reading of the 
harmless error statute, opining that the law applies to unsigned documents if 
                                                                                                                           
 163 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-503(2). The statute also applies to the tiny category of 
cases in which “the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the dece-
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 164 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404(B). In addition, the legislation carves out exceptions for “cir-
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 165 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24. 
 166 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended 1990); accord RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 Statutory Note 
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arguably consistent with this reading. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (noting that the 
foreign judges who have interpreted their own harmless error rules “have never excused noncom-
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& OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. (noting that “[a]mong the defects in execution that 
can be excused, the lack of a signature is the hardest to excuse. An unsigned will raises a serious 
but not insuperable doubt about whether the testator adopted the document as his or her will”). 
 167 See 3 A.3d 1258, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 1263. 
 172 See id. at 1264. 
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“(1) the decedent actually reviewed the document in question; and (2) 
thereafter gave his or her final assent to it.”173 
Two years later, Estate of Ehrlich put Macool’s dicta to the test.174 
Richard Ehrlich made no secret of the fact that he wanted to leave his estate 
to his nephew, Jonathan.175 Just before a major surgery, Ehrlich typed a 
fourteen-page document on legal paper with his name and law firm address 
printed in the margin of every page.176 It left three-quarters of the residue of 
the estate to Jonathan.177 In the right-hand corner of the cover page, Ehrlich 
had written that he had sent the original to his executor.178 Yet he had not 
signed the instrument.179 Later, Ehrlich told other people he had made a 
will.180 Two of the three appellate justices voted to admit the document to 
probate, reasoning that Ehrlich’s love for Jonathan, notation on the cover 
page, and statements about his will showcased his desire for the instrument 
to be effective.181 
Yet Justice Skillman wrote a lengthy dissent, explaining that he, like 
the trial court in Macool, read the harmless error rule only to apply to 
signed documents.182 Justice Skillman reached this conclusion by relying 
heavily on the UPC’s harmless error rule’s repeated use of the word “exe-
cuted.”183 As he explained, because the statute only applies to a document 
that “was not executed in compliance with the Wills Act, . . . it does not ap-
ply if the document was not executed at all.”184 Justice Skillman therefore 
read the UPC’s harmless error rule to mirror statutes in California, Colora-
do, Ohio, and Virginia and require the bare minimum formalities of a signed 
document.185 
* * * * 
The steps required to transmit assets after death vary from state to state 
and dispositive device to dispositive device. In some jurisdictions, the Wills 
Act continues to cast its long shadow. Yet the popularity of trusts and the 
advent of the harmless error rule have created uncertainty about the role of 
formalism in estate planning. The remainder of this Article considers three 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Id. at 1265. 
 174 See In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 16–17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
 175 See id. at 14. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See id. at 18. 
 182 See id. at 20–25 (Skillman, J., dissenting). 
 183 Id. at 20. 
 184 See id. (emphasis added). 
 185 See supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text. 
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topics that are likely to magnify this problem: electronic wills, trust-creation 
doctrine, and digital assets. 
II. ELECTRONIC WILLS 
There have been an increasing number of anecdotes about people try-
ing to save testamentary dispositions as word processing files or in other 
digital formats. This Part explains why the status of electronic wills in both 
strict compliance and harmless error states is unclear. It then argues that 
courts and lawmakers should regulate digital wills with an eye toward pre-
venting negative externalities. 
A. Will.Doc 
Tension between the testamentary formalities and technology is noth-
ing new. For example, many states adopted the Wills Act at a time when 
legal documents were generally handwritten.186 As a result, the first mass-
marketed typewriters in the 1860s raised questions about whether wills 
could include mechanically-produced text.187 Similarly, about three decades 
ago, the commercialization of cassette players and VCRs piqued interest in 
audio and video wills.188 In the 1983 case In re Estate of Reed, the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court refused to enforce dispositive instructions that a testa-
tor had tape recorded and placed in a signed and sealed envelope.189 The 
justices reasoned that the choice to validate wills in unorthodox formats was 
“for the legislature to make.”190 
Although boundary-pushing cases like In re Estate of Reed have been 
rare, electronic wills may soon shatter this calm. In the last decade, the ex-
plosive growth of electronic commerce has changed norms about paperless 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See, e.g., DAVID D. HALL, CULTURES OF PRINT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK 
100 (1996). 
 187 See, e.g., SASKATCHEWAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON ELECTRONIC WILLS 8 
(2004). 
 188 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 37, at 519; C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial 
Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harm-
less Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 337–38 (1991); 
Lisa L. McGarry, Note, Videotaped Wills: An Evidentiary Tool or a Written Will Substitute?, 77 
IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1215 (1992). One state, Indiana, allows videotapes to serve as evidence that a 
will was properly executed. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3.2 (West 2016). 
 189 See 672 P.2d 829, 833 (Wyo. 1983). The testator, Robert Reed, had handwritten on the 
envelope “[t]o be played in the event of my death only!” Id. at 830. Because there was nothing 
approximating witnesses’ signatures, the proponents of the “will” argued that it was a valid holo-
graph. See id. at 831. The state high court disagreed, explaining that such a will “must be entirely 
in the handwriting of the decedent” and that “a voice print is not handwriting.” Id. at 832. 
 190 Id. at 833. 
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transactions. As the Internet blossomed, consumers began to spend billions 
of dollars online.191 Conduct that once was unthinkable without tangible 
records—like banking, filing a lawsuit, and paying taxes—migrated to the 
web.192 
This shift spilled over into the realm of estate planning. For decades, 
companies like Nolo Press have sold forms and books designed to help lay-
people make their own wills.193 In the early 2000s, though, newly-minted 
businesses such as Quicken and LegalZoom harnessed the Internet to reboot 
this industry.194 These firms launched online platforms for customers who 
wished to make their own testamentary instruments.195 Admittedly, their sites 
are designed to generate electronic documents that are ultimately printed, 
signed, and witnessed.196 Yet many of these firms send drafts as email at-
tachments and store digital copies, creating the possibility that an incorpo-
real document will be the only testamentary footprint that an individual 
leaves.197 
The smartphone and social media movements have kicked this trend 
into high gear. Consumers can choose between several will-making apps for 
iPhones and Android devices.198 Testators are uploading video wills to 
YouTube.199 Startups are offering a variety of novel services, such as digital 
document archives,200 “ethical wills” that are stored in the cloud201 and 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES: A REVIEW OF THE EX-
CEPTIONS TO THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT 6 
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 192 See, e.g., D. Casey Flaherty & Corey Lovato, Digital Signatures and the Paperless Office, 
17 J. INTERNET L. 3, 4 (2014) (noting that “[w]e pay our mortgages, buy our plane tickets, and 
secure credit without ever gripping a pen”); Gürer, supra note 53, at 1980–81. 
 193 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 (1981). 
 194 See Christine Larson, A Need for a Will? Often, There’s an Online Way, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/business/yourmoney/14wills.html [https://perma.cc/
68M4-3ZU6]. 
 195 See id. 
 196 See id. 
 197 See, e.g., Cybermill, Last Will, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/last-
will/id390975138?mt=8 [https://perma.cc/2BMC-ZA3H]; RocketLawyer, We Can Help, https://
www.rocketlawyer.com/estate-planning-guide/how-we-can-help.rl [https://perma.cc/9YWD-N7LY] 
(explaining that “your estate plan will always be available, from any device, any time you need it”). 
 198 See, e.g., Last Will and Testament, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/store/apps/last-will-
and-testament/9wzdncrdgbrp [https://perma.cc/8SXX-22RD]. 
 199 See, e.g., Duncan Geere, Death 2.0: The Future of Digital Wills, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/death-20-the-future-of-digital-wills [https://perma.cc/D2LM-HB78]. 
 200 See, e.g., Constance Gustke, Is a Digital Last Will and Testament Right for You?, CNBC: 
MONEY 20/20 (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/19/is-a-digital-last-will-and-testament-
right-for-you.html [https://perma.cc/Y32U-Y272]. 
 201 See, e.g., Susan Friedland, New Smartphone App Lets You Get the Last Word as Well as 
Last Will and Testament, VANGORODSKA LAW FIRM, http://www.nyestatelawfirm.com/new- 
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computerized estate plans that are linked to a customer’s financial accounts 
and updated in real time.202 
“myWill” App for iPhone 
 
A handful of cases from Australia—which, as noted, adopted harmless 
error before the United States—have grappled with digital wills.203 For ex-
ample, in a 2011 case decided by the Supreme Court of Queensland, Mahlo 
v. Hehir, Dr. Karen Mahlo signed an orthodox attested will in February 
2008.204 It appointed her then-boyfriend, John Hehir, as executor and left 
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 203 See, e.g., Estate of Currie [2015] NSWLR 1098 ¶ 22 (Austl.) (enforcing will saved on a 
computer when decedent told friend, “If anything happens to me[,] I have made a will. It’s en-
crypted”); Estate of Yu [2013] Qd R 322 ¶ 9 (Austl.) (enforcing will made on iPhone); Estate of 
Trethewey [2002] VR 406 ¶ 24 (Austl.) (enforcing computer file that was consistent with dece-
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 204 See [2011] Qd R 243 ¶ 1 (Austl.). 
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her house to him.205 About a month later, Karen and John broke up.206 Then, 
in May 2008, Karen apparently saved a file entitled “This is the last will 
and testament of Karen Lee Mahlo.docx” in Microsoft Word on her home 
computer.207 This document appointed her brother, Brett, as executor, and 
left her estate to people other than John.208 It concluded with three blank 
signature blocks.209 Around this time, Karen told her father that she was 
working on a new will that made Brett executor.210 In addition, she handed 
him a printed and signed document, which he did not read closely, and said 
“this is my will.”211 Karen committed suicide about two weeks later.212 No 
paper copy of her will could be found.213 
 
Excerpts from Karen Lee Mahlo’s Purported Electronic Will 
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After a protracted trial, the Supreme Court of Queensland held that the 
evidence failed to establish that Karen intended the Word document to be 
her will.214 The court cited the fact that Karen had made a formal, attested 
will only months before to support its conclusion that “she knew that in 
making a new will, she had to do more than type or modify a document up-
on her computer.”215 In fact, it appeared that Karen had set the wheels of 
will execution in motion by printing and signing the paper copy of the Word 
file that she showed to her father.216 As the court noted, this was particularly 
troubling, because one way a testator can revoke her will is if it was last in 
her possession and cannot be found after she dies.217 Thus, even if she had 
intended the electronic document to be her will, there was no way to dis-
prove the possibility that she later changed her mind.218 
In the 2011 case Yazbek v. Yazbek, however, the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales reached the opposite result under similar circumstances.219 In 
mid-July of 2009, Daniel Yazbek, a restauranteur, was planning a vacation 
overseas.220 In an abundance of caution, Daniel told Michael Girgis, a busi-
ness associate, that “‘there is a will on my computer and also one at home in 
a draw[er].’”221 Daniel returned from his trip unharmed but killed himself 
about a year later.222 
Although Daniel’s laptop was locked, his family was able to guess the 
password.223 On the hard drive, they found a Microsoft Word document 
called “Will.doc” that had been created, edited, and saved several times in 
July of 2009.224 The file was part suicide note and part testamentary disposi-
tion.225 It concluded with the words “love and light,” followed by Daniel’s 
full name in the place where a signature would appear.226 At trial, an expert 
testified that he did not think that the document had been printed, although 
Daniel had opened it in September 2010, about two weeks before his 
death.227 
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In an exhaustive thirty-page opinion, the court admitted Will.doc into 
probate.228 It reasoned that Daniel’s choice to call the file his “Will” and his 
statement to Michael in 2009 about having made an e-will elucidated that 
he meant the instrument to be effective.229 In addition, the court relied heav-
ily on the expert’s testimony that Daniel had accessed the document shortly 
before he died and neither deleted nor changed it.230 
Unlike Australia, the law in the United States is still embryonic. In 
2001, Nevada became the first American jurisdiction to pass a statute that 
validates digital testamentary instruments.231 This pioneering legislation 
was designed to lure wealthy, tech-savvy clients from neighboring Califor-
nia.232 It requires e-wills to contain an “authentication characteristic of the 
testator,” which can include “a retinal scan, voice recognition, facial recog-
nition, [or] a digitized signature.”233 In the decade and a half since the law 
has been in effect, however, it has been rarely, if ever, invoked.234 
In addition, whether digital wills are enforceable in other states is any-
one’s guess. First, electronic wills may not satisfy the Wills Act requirement 
that testators explain their wishes “in writing.”235 Some probate codes de-
fine that word broadly. For example, Iowa and Virginia’s forward-looking 
laws acknowledge that “writing” can include “words [or] letters . . . stored 
in an electronic . . . medium.”236 Yet in other contexts, “writing” is often 
limited to “typewriting” and “printing.”237 Thus, in strict compliance juris-
dictions, e-wills may not clear the first hurdle. 
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 229 See id. ¶¶ 42, 154. 
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Judges in harmless error states, however, will likely reach a different 
result. The text of most harmless error statutes applies not only to “writ-
ing[s]” but also to “document[s].”238 In general, “the interpretation of ‘doc-
ument’ has been liberal.”239 Indeed, that term covers “information stored on 
a computer, electronic storage device, or any other medium.”240 Thus, even 
if a digital will fails to be a writing in a strict compliance jurisdiction, it 
may be a viable document in a harmless error state. 
Whether typing one’s name in pixels is a “signature” under the Wills 
Act is even more daunting and important.241 Notably, if courts decide that a 
signature must be in ink, harmless error may be powerless to excuse depar-
tures from this norm. Recall that harmless error statutes in California, Colo-
rado, Ohio, and Virginia cannot cure a missing signature.242 Moreover, there 
is a split of opinion on whether the UPC mandates that a testator execute 
her will.243 Additionally, because the Wills Act also requires the witnesses to 
sign the will, even an attested electronic document like Javier Castro’s 
might not be valid in a strict compliance jurisdiction if judges read “signa-
ture” narrowly.244 Thus, much rides on what it means to sign a will. 
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One case suggests that electronic signatures are permissible, but it has 
unusual facts. In the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ 2003 decision of Taylor v. 
Holt, Stephen Godfrey wrote a one-page will on his computer.245 He invited 
two neighbors to look at his screen as he wrote his name in a cursive font at 
the end of the word processing document.246 He then printed the instrument 
and his neighbors signed the tangible copy as witnesses.247 A Tennessee ap-
pellate court enforced the will, reasoning that Stephen “simply used a com-
puter rather than an ink pen as the tool to make his signature.”248 The court 
did not address whether it would have reached the same result if there was 
no direct evidence that it had actually been Stephen (as opposed to some 
other person) who typed his name. 
On the other hand, the Connecticut Superior Court in Litevich v. Pro-
bate Court in 2013 refused to stretch the definition of “signature.”249 In 
2011, Carole Berger decided to make a will using Legalzoom.250 She creat-
ed an account and filled out the necessary information, including her social 
security number.251 She reviewed the documents, paid for them with her 
credit card, and arranged for them to be shipped to her.252 She then died be-
fore she could sign the drafted will.253 A Connecticut trial court rejected the 
argument that Carole’s online approval of the Legalzoom estate plan was 
“tantamount to a signature,” reasoning that it was not prepared to find that 
“modern authentication techniques are equally reliable” as conventional 
methods.254 
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In sum, it is unclear whether e-wills are valid writings that are signed by 
the testator and the witnesses. The remainder of this Part examines the broad-
er normative question of what the law should be.255 It starts by critiquing the 
intent paradigm: the dominant descriptive understanding of Wills Act formal-
ism.256 It then explains why a different rationale—preventing spillover 
costs—can justify retaining formalism in the face of new technology.257 
B. The Intent Paradigm 
The proposition that formalism furthers testamentary intent is firmly 
embedded in wills law. This idea appeared in opinions long before Gulliver, 
Tilson, and Fuller popularized it in their seminal articles. For instance, in 
1914, the New York Surrogate’s Court opined that “[t]he execution of a last 
will and testament is a solemn and formal act” because it “safeguard[s] the 
interests of the decedent.”258 Today, more than a century later, many courts 
continue to sound the same note. They reason that strictly construing the 
Wills Act prevents “fraud, perjury, [and] mistake”259 and preserves “the in-
violability and sanctity of a testator’s right[s].”260 
It is easy to see why most modern scholars are skeptical of this view.261 
The Wills Act is a crude sorting mechanism. It simplifies what could be a 
sprawling investigation into the decedent’s mental state into a manageable 
test that hinges on the physical appearance of the writing.262 In one way, it 
is an excellent proxy: if a document complies with the statute, it can be 
safely assumed that it was supposed to be a will.263 The converse, however, 
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 258 In re Harty’s Estate, 148 N.Y.S. 1052, 1053, 630 (Sur. Ct. 1914). 
 259 In re Estate of Burton v. Didricksen, 358 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (quota-
tion omitted). 
 260 In re Estate of Chastain, 401 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tenn. 2012) (quotation omitted). 
 261 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law, 73 WASH. 
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apparent from the face of the document. See Wills Act 1837, 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9 (Eng.); supra 
note 104 and accompanying text. 
 263 Admittedly, there are exceptional cases in which a document that complies with the Wills 
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is not true: the mere fact that an instrument defies the Wills Act does not 
necessarily prove that it is illegitimate. The strict compliance caselaw is not 
attuned to this nuance. Instead, it treats any deviation from the statute as 
fatal. By bringing the inquiry to a screeching halt, it ignores the decedent’s 
statements, circumstances, and conduct during the execution ceremony. For 
these reasons, formalists have it backwards. Reading the statute literally 
does not preserve testators’ wishes, but does violence to them. 
Counter-intuitively, however, the functionalist prescription for this 
malady—the harmless error rule—also has a fraught relationship with tes-
tamentary intent. In part, harmless error is radical. It effectively deletes the 
attestation requirement from the Wills Act. Indeed, in every harmless error 
jurisdiction but Ohio, courts can admit an unwitnessed document into pro-
bate.264 In other ways, however, harmless error is cut from the same stiff 
cloth as the centuries of law it abolished. As noted, many harmless error 
states insist that the testator sign the document.265 This requirement is abso-
lute. Judges cannot excuse the lack of a signature no matter how obviously 
a decedent wanted to make a will. In this way, harmless error does not erase 
the bright lines of conventional law. Instead, it merely adjusts where the 
bright lines are drawn. 
This vestige of strict compliance is as hard to justify on intent-serving 
grounds as any mechanized principle. To be sure, one might argue that un-
signed wills are such fertile grounds for misunderstandings or fabrications 
that they must be banned. If the particular testator’s goals are paramount, 
though, it is unclear why judges should make across-the-board determina-
tions rather than diving into the facts of each case. Should a court deny pro-
bate to the will of Columbia Law School founder Theodore W. Dwight, who 
passed away, pen in hand, before he could complete his signature?266 If in-
tent is the glowing thing, then no formality should stand firm in the face of 
a hurricane of evidence that it obstructs a decedent’s wishes. Indeed, whole-
sale rules do not vindicate individual intent. 
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Electronic wills vividly illustrate why policymakers cannot calibrate 
formalities with the sole objective of facilitating a decedent’s intent. Some 
commentators have argued that wills should always be in an old-fashioned 
writing to prevent the probate of sham documents.267 Text on a computer 
lacks the gravitas of ink. It can be superstitiously created, deleted, and al-
tered.268 Likewise, typing one’s name at the end of a word processing doc-
ument is a pale substitute for a signature. After all, handwriting is unique 
and font is fungible. Here, though, is where the problems start. If intent is 
the lodestar principle, there is no reason to be dogmatic about any particular 
formality. For example, other than its electronic format, Javier Castro’s will 
had multiple badges of authenticity, including the “handwritten” signatures 
of Javier and three witnesses.269 Likewise, the testator’s name typed in 
twelve-point Times New Roman might be suspicious. The same, however, 
does not hold for Steve Godfrey’s signature, which he pecked out in a 
unique cursive font in front of his neighbors.270 One can imagine similar 
scenarios in which a decedent texts her wishes in front of two witnesses or 
publishes her will using her password-protected Facebook account. The in-
tent paradigm offers no reason to exclude these scenarios from probate. 
Thus, although formalism may sometimes ensure that testamentary 
transfers are sober, legitimate, and voluntary, it often thwarts a decedent’s 
wishes. Nevertheless, the next section explains why courts and lawmakers 
could plausibly construe the Wills Act literally even when doing so over-
rides a decedent’s intent.271 
C. E-Wills and the Anti-Externality Function 
In the fields of contracts and property, courts and lawmakers some-
times refuse to honor transfers between competent and consenting individu-
als in order to protect the interests of other parties.272 This section explains 
why the same core logic underlies some Wills Act formalities.273 It then ar-
gues that this anti-externality function of testamentary formalism applies 
with special force to electronic wills.274 
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The idea that the Wills Act formalities prevent negative externalities is 
not entirely novel. One can catch glimmers of it in three places. First, some 
commentators have observed that the evidentiary and channeling propensi-
ties of the writing and signature elements limit the burden on courts.275 
These signifiers of intent make wills easy to identify.276 In turn, standardiz-
ing the outward appearance of testamentary instruments is particularly val-
uable in the bureaucratic world of probate.277 Judges and their staff must 
process dozens or even hundreds of wills each month and cannot spare the 
time or effort to scrutinize idiosyncratic documents.278 
Second, concern about the burden on the judicial system has also sur-
faced during the debate over the harmless error rule. Scholars have voiced 
concern that replacing strict compliance with harmless error may increase 
litigation rates by providing new ammunition to disappointed heirs.279 Sup-
pose a decedent creates a typewritten but unattested document. Under tradi-
tional law, filing a petition for probate is a fool’s errand: the court cannot 
look beyond the four corners of the flawed writing. Once the crystalline 
statutory elements have been replaced with a muddy standard, however, all 
manner of malformed instruments may come out of the woodwork. 
Third, judges and academics sometimes claim that strict compliance fur-
thers the interests of decedents as a class. As a Kansas appellate court re-
marked, a zero tolerance policy for execution errors pays off in the long run: 
It is undoubtedly true that from time to time an honest attempt to 
execute a last will and testament is defeated by failure to observe 
some one or more of the statutory requirements. It is better this 
should happen under a proper construction of the statute, than that 
the individual case should be permitted to weaken those provi-
sions calculated to protect testators generally from fraudulent al-
terations of their wills.280 
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Similarly, scholars sometimes argue that formalism safeguards intent indi-
rectly. Because testators and their attorneys have the axe of strict compli-
ance hanging over their heads, they must be meticulous.281 Even if the stat-
ute scuttles the wishes of someone who clearly meant to make a will, it cre-
ates incentives for future testators to track down that additional witness or 
double-check that the signatures are in the right place.282 Both of these 
views of strict compliance also revolve around the desire to prevent nega-
tive externalities. Indeed, they sacrifice testamentary intent at the altar of 
the greater good, making an individual decedent’s wishes subservient to the 
needs of unnamed future testators. 
Electronic wills take these concerns to a new level. Although time may 
tell whether allowing digital instruments will lead to a spike in lawsuits, we 
already have a sense of what these lawsuits will look like. As the Australian 
cases reveal, disputes over e-wills are intensely time-consuming.283 Like all 
harmless error cases, which plunge the court into the minutiae of the dece-
dent’s life and circumstances, they require detailed testimony from numer-
ous witnesses.284 On top of this, they also involve highly technical expert 
opinions.285 Indeed, one Australian judge has already complained—albeit in 
a case involving testamentary disposition recorded on a DVD, not a com-
puter—about “the transaction costs of satisfying the [c]ourt that those 
[harmless error] requirements have been met.”286 
Attempts to probate digital wills also have a way of tracking other le-
gal issues through the courthouse door. For instance, as mentioned, a will 
that was last in the testator’s possession but cannot be found at her death is 
presumed to be revoked.287 Accordingly, as the judge in Mahlo observed, if 
the evidence establishes that an e-will has been printed, the court must in-
vestigate both whether the testator intended to make a will and whether the 
testator meant to rescind the missing tangible copy of that will.288 Similarly, 
a striking commonality in these cases is that they involve decedents who 
committed suicide. Indeed, Karter Yu, Karen Mahlo, and Daniel Yazbek all 
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took their own lives.289 Even the death of Javier Castro, who refused a 
blood transfusion, was a kind of suicide.290 It may be that decedents are es-
pecially drawn to the slapdash format of non-traditional wills when they are 
mentally unstable. If that trend continues, electronic will cases may also 
degenerate into disputes over capacity. 
Relaxing the writing requirement also creates headaches for the survi-
vors who must locate a decedent’s will. Suppose a state gives people carte 
blanche to outline their testamentary wishes on their iPhones or Microsoft 
Word. Most of these testators will not die for decades. By then, the relent-
less tide of obsolescence will have washed over whatever device or pro-
gram they used. As anyone who has ever seen a punch card or a floppy disk 
knows, today’s computerized documents will probably be nearly inaccessi-
ble in the future.291 Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that testamen-
tary instructions will be locked away. In fact, Daniel Yazbek’s family was 
only able to obtain a copy of his e-will because they were lucky enough to 
guess his laptop password.292 
In fact, without the baseline requirement of a physical writing, even 
more outlandish examples are possible. For example, in 2015, a Manhattan 
start-up company put out a press release trumpeting the fact that it was us-
ing blockchain, the technology behind the Bitcoin, to “chang[e] how people 
manage . . . their estates.”293 Blockchain enables secure online transactions 
without a trusted, central authority, such as PayPal or a bank.294 It does so 
by creating a publically-available record—a “ledger”—of each exchange.295 
This ledger can only be updated with the consent of a majority of users, 
known as “miners.”296 This distributed consensus model creates the possi-
bility of the inheritance process “execut[ing] automatically, without in-
volvement of a court or government or central authority”297 It also raises the 
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specter of a posthumous wealth transfer that is completely off the grid—so 
cloaked in code that it is invisible to all the relevant constituencies. 
For these reasons, courts and policymakers might tread carefully as 
they decide whether to loosen the “writing” and “signature” elements of the 
Wills Act. To be sure, in about half of the harmless error states, it is too late: 
the statute’s use of the elastic term “document” and (arguable) disregard of 
the “signature” requirement has abolished all of the relevant formalities.298 
Yet judges in strict compliance jurisdictions—as well as the harmless error 
states of California, Colorado, Ohio, and Virginia—can read the essential 
formality of “signature” to mean handwritten in ink. Doing so would not 
only discourage litigation, but would also make wills as transparent and 
user-friendly as possible. 
To summarize, the need to prevent spillover costs—not the desire to 
carry out a decedent’s intent—furnishes the most forceful reasons to take 
the Wills Act at its letter. This anti-externality theory fits digital wills like a 
glove. In addition, as explained next, it also animates the neglected issue of 
trust formalism. 
III. TRUST FORMALISM 
Unlike the lively debate over the Wills Act, the rules that govern trust 
creation have lurked in obscurity. This Part demonstrates that trust formal-
ism has quietly become a serious problem.299 It then urges courts to adopt a 
trust-specific harmless error rule.300 
A. Phantom and Incomplete Trusts 
Trust formalism is usually considered to be a non-issue. Although 
property is an element of a valid trust,301 settlors usually take elaborate 
measures to satisfy this demand. They attach an appendix called “Schedule 
A” to the back of the trust instrument that lists the trust’s assets.302 In fact, 
many settlors go further and change title to their possessions through deeds 
and assignments to the trustee.303 On top of this, as mentioned above, set-
tlors can also take an elegant shortcut and declare themselves trustee, obvi-
ating the need for a formal transfer.304 Declarations of trust are immune 
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from the delivery requirement.305 Also, when a settlor memorializes a decla-
ration of trust in writing, her signature satisfies the statute of frauds for con-
veying land into the trust.306 For these reasons, trusts—particularly declara-
tions of trust—are regarded as jarring departures from the Wills Act: 
“anomalous” creations that “require[] no formality.”307 
Underneath the radar, however, courts have begun to strike down 
botched attempts to make trusts. For starters, settlors who name third parties 
as trustees sometimes violate the delivery requirement. Consider the Court of 
Appeals of Arkansas’ 2004 decision, Trott v. Jones.308 Kathryn Rhodehamel 
tried to appoint Richard Trott and Cheryl Lynn Trott as co-trustees of a trust 
that contained her house.309 Yet she never presented Richard or Cheryl with 
a deed to the land.310 An Arkansas appellate panel rejected the argument that 
Kathryn’s “bare intent sufficed to create a trust.”311 Instead, the court rea-
soned, Kathryn’s disregard of the formalities required to pass title to the 
trustee was fatal to her putative trust.312 Indeed, there have been a rash of 
cases in which settlors have forgotten to deliver assets to third party trus-
tees, creating what the Montana Supreme Court evocatively called “phan-
tom . . . trust[s]”: those that are doomed by a lack of property.313 
Settlors are also creating “incomplete trusts,” which do not contain all 
of the assets that they intended to place in trust. Although there is a split in 
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authority, some courts hold that settlors who name third party trustees need 
to make the trustee the title-holder of record for cars, stocks, partnership 
interests, and financial accounts.314 For instance, in the Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina’s 2003 decision, In re Estate of Washburn, Vera Washburn 
drafted a trust that appointed Jerry Scruggs and John Cabiness as co-
trustees.315 Vera also signed an assignment that purported to convey all of 
her common stock to the trustees.316 The court held that to transfer securi-
ties to a third party trustee, a settlor must endorse the stock certificates and 
deliver them.317 Because Vera did neither, her stocks never made it into the 
trust.318 
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the statute of frauds requires a trust 
containing land to be signed by the trustee.319 Because settlors often think 
that their own signature on the instrument suffices, this extra obligation can 
be a nasty surprise.320 In the nightmarish California Court of Appeal case of 
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Osswald v. Anderson, decided in 1996, Otto and Heidi Osswald signed a 
written declaration in 1987 attempting to name themselves trustees of a 
trust that included their home.321 Due to an oversight, though, they did not 
attach Schedule A to the instrument.322 In 1988, the Osswalds decided to 
make their son Gary trustee.323 They created a new trust with a Schedule A 
that listed their residence, but they forgot to get Gary’s signature.324 Despite 
copious evidence of the Osswalds’ intent, the court held that both purported 
trusts violated the statute of frauds.325 Although the Osswalds signed the 
1987 declaration of trust as settlors and trustees, it held no assets because of 
the missing Schedule A.326 Although the 1988 trust mentioned the 
Osswalds’ house on Schedule A, it named non-signatory Gary—not the 
Osswalds—as trustee.327 Accordingly, the Osswalds’ signatures on the in-
strument were irrelevant.328 
A final common glitch occurs when a settlor tries to set up multiple 
trusts. To create Trust 1, the settlor conveys assets from herself as an indi-
vidual to herself as trustee.329 Later, she wants to replace Trust 1 with Trust 
2. She again attempts to deed or assign property from herself in her personal 
capacity to herself as trustee of Trust 2.330 This accomplishes nothing. After 
Trust 1 is up and running, the settlor as trustee—not the settlor as an indi-
vidual—owns the corpus.331 Indeed, as the Virginia Supreme Court recently 
explained, the settlor has “no legal title in the property to convey in h[er] in-
dividual capacity” to Trust 2.332 As a result, Trust 2 is unfunded and inva-
lid.333 
                                                                                                                           
 321 Osswald, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id. at 25. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. at 27–28. 
 326 Id. 
 327 Id. 
 328 See id. at 27. 
 329 See, e.g., id. at 24; Midwest Tr. Co. v. Ong, 293 P.3d 168, No. 106,744, 2013 WL 310353, 
at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013); Austin v. City of Alexandria, 574 S.E.2d 289, 290 (Va. 2003). 
 330 See, e.g., Osswald, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25; Midwest Tr. Co., 2013 WL 310353, at *1; Aus-
tin, 574 S.E. 2d at 291. 
 331 See, e.g., Osswald, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27; Midwest Tr. Co., 2013 WL 310353, at *6–7. 
 332 Austin, 574 S.E.2d at 293. 
 333 See, e.g., Osswald, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27; Midwest Tr. Co., 2013 WL 310353, at *6–7; 
Austin, 574 S.E.2d at 293; cf. Cody v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(holding that a settlor failed to create a trust when he had transferred his townhouse out of his trust 
and “simply forgot to do the necessary paperwork” to deed it back into the trust). In addition, 
Trust 1 often requires the settlor to invoke specific procedures to remove assets from the trust that 
can be an independent ground that the transfer into Trust 2 is ineffective. See, e.g., Midwest Tr. 
Co., 2013 WL 310353 at *5–7 (noting that the settlor could only “remov[e] certain property from 
the Trust estate provided that she complied with the procedures established by the trust agree- 
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To get a sense of the prevalence of phantom and incomplete trusts, it is 
helpful to look beyond the sliver of cases that both degenerate into disputes 
and become reported opinions. Of course, unlike wills and intestacies, 
which travel through the open chambers of probate court, trusts are admin-
istered privately.334 Yet some trusts can leave a footprint in the public rec-
ord. Well-advised settlors usually back up their trusts by executing “pour-
over” wills.335 A pour-over will has one purpose: to bequeath any right or 
item that a settlor still owns in her individual capacity at death to her 
trust.336 This precaution ensures that all of the settlor’s assets—even those 
that she does not retitle in the name of the trustee—pass under the terms of 
her trust.337 Ideally, pour over wills should not be probated.338 Even if a set-
tlor owns some rights or items in her individual capacity upon death, juris-
dictions exempt low-value estates from probate.339 For example, in Califor-
nia, a decedent whose will transmits less than $150,000 is not subject to the 
court’s jurisdiction.340 Thus, the fact that a pour-over will surfaces in the 
probate records is a telltale sign that something went dramatically wrong 
with a settlor’s effort to create a trust. 
I discovered that pour over wills can be a surprisingly large part of the 
probate caseload. In a previous series of projects, I examined every probate 
administration stemming from deaths that occurred during the course of 
2007 in Alameda County, California, an urban area near San Francisco.341 
This dataset contains 399 testate cases. Remarkably, a whopping sixty-
seven of these matters, or seventeen percent, were pour-over wills. That is, 
one out of every six wills in the sample of probate matters was a shadow 
cast by an invalid trust.342 
                                                                                                                           
ment”); Austin, 574 S.E.2d at 293 (explaining that the settlor needed to withdraw property from 
the trust by executing a deed). 
 334 See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 557 (2008). 
 335 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GAU, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION 61 (2005). 
 336 See id. 
 337 See id. 
 338 See id. 
 339 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 735.201 (2016) (setting the floor at $75,000); MASS. GEN. LAWS. 
ch. 190B, § 3-1201 (2016) (setting the floor at $25,000). 
 340 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 13100 (West 2016). 
 341 See generally David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Probate Lending, 126 YALE 
L.J. 102 (2016); David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County, 
California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605 (2015); David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
1094 (2015). 
 342 Admittedly, someone might probate a pour-over will for reasons that have nothing to do 
with a trust failing. For starters, in many states’ probate systems, non-claim statutes require credi-
tors to file claims against the estate within four months of the appointment of the personal repre-
sentative. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended  
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To try to reverse-engineer the malfunction that had caused these trusts 
to fail, I examined the assets that were passing by pour over will.343 Thir-
teen estates contained real property exclusively, suggesting that the settlor 
had either violated the delivery requirement, the statute of frauds, or the 
rules governing trust-to-trust transfers. Title changing seemed to be an even 
larger problem. Nearly half of the pour-over wills transmitted financial as-
sets, such as CDs, mutual or money market funds, or savings and checking 
accounts. Likewise, nearly $80,000,000 in stocks were omitted from trusts, 
although the bulk of this figure stemmed from one extraordinarily wealthy 
decedent.344 
Table 1.  Assets in Pour Over Wills: Alameda County, California (2007) 
 Real Property Stocks 
Financial 
Accounts 
Pensions, 
Insurance, 
and Annuities 
Other 
Number of 
Estates 
Containing 
Asset 
19 18 25 10 11 
Total Value 
of Assets 
$12,443,453 $79,992,619 $5,098,529 $790,376 $512,875 
 
Admittedly, my data may exaggerate the current prevalence of incom-
plete trusts. Because the Alameda County estates arose from deaths in 2007, 
most of them were closed by 2010. In 2011, a California appellate court in 
Kucker v. Kucker held that an assignment of all of the settlor’s property was 
sufficient to convey stocks to the trustee even though the stock certificate 
had been lost.345 It is possible that some assets in my sample—including 
                                                                                                                           
2010). When the decedent was a doctor or lawyer, her personal representative might opt into pro-
bate in order to get this short statute of limitations running against potential malpractice lawsuits. 
Likewise, one might probate a pour-over will in order to exercise a testamentary power of ap-
pointment (the ability to dispose of someone else’s property in your own will). See, e.g., In re 
Estate of Scott, 77 P.3d 906, 910 (Colo. App. 2003). These may not explain, however, the preva-
lence of pour-over wills in the Alameda County files. First, California allows trustees to invoke a 
four month non-claim statute that is similar to the probate model. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 19040, 
19100(a) (West 2016). As a result, it is not necessary to go through probate to gain the maximum 
protection against lurking malpractice allegations. Moreover, even though it is often necessary to 
begin a probate proceeding in order to exercise a power of appointment, there is no requirement 
that the estate march through the process until the bitter end. See Crook v. Contreras, 116 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 319, 322 (Ct. App. 2002). Because the pour-over wills in the data were fully probated, it 
seems unlikely that they were filed merely to exercise a power. Finally, there are other theories 
that cannot be ruled out, such as decedents acquiring property after they executed their estate plan 
or simply never getting around to transferring assets to the trust. 
 343 This data was only available for fifty-five estates. 
 344 This decedent’s estate was worth $81,150,000, including $76,350,000 in stocks. 
 345 See Kucker, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 689–90. 
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bank or investment accounts and stocks—were also subject to broad as-
signments, and thus would pass seamlessly under the terms of the trust to-
day. Likewise, there are rumors that some financial institutions refuse to 
recognize settlors’ efforts to fund a trust and demand a court order before 
releasing funds to the trustee.346 If this practice is indeed widespread, it 
would increase the number of pour-over wills that transmit paper assets 
through probate even if the underlying trust has no technical defect. 
On the other hand, my findings may also understate the incidence of 
formality hiccups. For one, because California exempts estates worth less 
than $150,000 from probate, there may be many more cases featuring failed 
trusts in which the value of the decedent’s property was too low to qualify 
for court supervision. In addition, other settlors whose trusts were invalid 
may not have executed pour-over wills. Because their assets would have 
passed through intestacy, their court files would not have contained any ref-
erence to the ruined trust. 
In sum, trusts have their own execution tripwires. Trusts collapse when 
settlors fail to deliver the corpus, violate the statute of frauds, and neglect to 
retitle assets. As discussed next, these formalities are even more divorced 
from the goal of facilitating decedents’ intent than the infamous Wills Act 
jurisprudence. 
B. Harmless Error for Trusts 
This section takes a closer look at the policy bases for trust formal-
ism.347 It argues that the only plausible rationale for these rules is to prevent 
negative externalities. Nevertheless, it also concludes that this objective 
does not justify making trust formalities immutable. Instead, judges should 
be able to excuse minor slipups in the trust-formation process. 
Some trust-creation rules have been imported from other spheres in 
which their intent-serving functions are well known. For instance, the deliv-
ery requirement for trusts with third party trustees stems from the law of 
gifts.348 In that context, delivery dovetails with the Gulliver, Tilson, and 
Fuller framework.349 When an owner contemplates handing over an item, 
she experiences a mental jolt, or what Lewis Meechum called the “wrench” 
                                                                                                                           
 346 See, e.g., C. Terry Johnson, A New Way to Establish and Fund a Living Trust: But How 
Do We Recognize the Trustee?, 16 OHIO PROB. L.J. 111 (2006) (noting that banks and other fi-
nancial institutions are sometimes unwilling to honor a settlor’s assignment to a trust). 
 347 See infra notes 348–374 and accompanying text. 
 348 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 349 See, e.g., Gordon v. Barr, 91 P.2d 101, 103–04 (Cal. 1939). 
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of delivery.350 If the owner follows through and relinquishes custody to the 
donee, we know that she is resolute about making a gift.351 Likewise, deliv-
ery can pierce the fog of ambiguous statements to demonstrate that the do-
nor wanted to complete a transfer.352 Thus, some writers have opined that 
the purpose of the delivery requirement in trust law is to prove that the set-
tlor wanted to make a trust.353 
Upon close inspection, however, delivery’s ritual and evidentiary pur-
poses are superfluous in modern estate planning. When trusts serve as will 
substitutes, they are enshrined in a detailed writing that bears the settlor’s 
signature.354 Even if the settlor did not give the corpus to the trustee, her 
execution of this highly formal instrument reveals that she deliberated and 
decided to transfer property into a trust. On top of this, recall that settlors 
often sign deeds, assignments, and pour-over wills.355 The time and effort 
required to create these satellite documents dispels any doubt about a set-
tlor’s plans or motivations. 
Likewise, some of the formalities for trusts that contain real property 
are wholly unrelated to the settlor’s intent. As noted, in a few jurisdictions, 
the statute of frauds demands that the trustee sign a writing to transfer land 
into trust.356 This rule leads to a perverse result when the settlor names a 
third party trustee. In that situation, the settlor’s signature on the trust in-
strument is not enough to salvage the trust. The trust disintegrates even 
though the defect—the absence of the trustee’s signature—sheds no light on 
what the settlor was trying to do. 
The same is true of title-changing formalities. Trusts can be stillborn 
when a settlor attempts to create successive instruments but fails to transfer 
property from herself as trustee of Trust 1 to herself as trustee of Trust 2.357 
These cases involve the rankest of technicalities. Indeed, failed trust-to-trust 
transfers hinge on nothing more than the fact that the settlor failed to add 
the words “as trustee” after her name on a deed or assignment. The settlor’s 
unfamiliarity with the legal nicety that she no longer owns the assets in 
Trust 1 as an individual has no bearing on whether she wanted Trust 2 to be 
effective. Indeed, as one federal district court explained, the problem is not 
                                                                                                                           
 350 Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action 
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1926). 
 351 See id. 
 352 See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 307, at 399. 
 353 See, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 38, at 16. 
 354 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 43, at 53. 
 355 See supra notes 302, 334–335 and accompanying text. 
 356 See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 357 See supra notes 328–332 and accompanying text. 
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that the settlor’s desires are unclear, but rather that she “simply forgot to do 
the necessary paperwork.”358 
As with wills law, the need to prevent negative externalities is a more 
persuasive explanation for trust formalism. Some trust-creation rules force 
settlors to provide information to other stakeholders. For instance, the man-
dates that the settlor deliver the corpus and obtain the trustee’s signature are 
helpful for trustees. A trust can be created without the trustee’s 
knowledge.359 To be sure, nobody owes a duty to administer a trust until 
they accept the office of trustee.360 Yet because the standard for assenting to 
a trusteeship is open-ended and easily satisfied, a third party can be oblivi-
ous to the fact that she has become a trustee.361 For example, in one case, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a bank accepted a trusteeship by re-
imbursing a beneficiary for the settlor’s funeral expenses even though it 
sent him six letters declining to serve as trustee.362 In another, a Nebraska 
appellate panel concluded that a daughter became trustee for her mentally 
impaired father when she verbally agreed to handle his finances and signed 
checks on his behalf.363 Being an unwitting trustee is a one-way ticket to 
fiduciary liability. An easy way to breach a trust is to fail to manage it pru-
dently, and one cannot manage something prudently when one does not re-
alize that one is supposed to manage it at all.364 Insisting that the settlor de-
                                                                                                                           
 358 Cody, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 688. In fact, the settlor’s confusion about the capacity in which 
she holds title is perfectly understandable. For instance, in revocable inter vivos trusts—the go-to 
vehicle for estate planning—the creation of the trust has virtually no effect on the settlor’s rights. 
Even after she makes Trust 1, she enjoys all the privileges that she enjoyed before: she can sell, 
abandon, destroy, or give away the corpus. Indeed, in the typical scenario where the settlor makes 
herself the trustee and sole lifetime beneficiary, she owes no duties to any of the contingent bene-
ficiaries. See, e.g., Ex Parte Synovus Tr. Co., 41 So. 3d 70, 74 (Ala. 2009); Fulp v. Gilliland, 998 
N.E.2d 204, 205 (Ind. 2013); In re Stephen M. Gunther Revocable Living Tr., 350 S.W.3d 44, 47 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2011); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (amended 2010). 
Thus, when she tries to make Trust 2, it would be very easy to overlook the fact that she no longer 
owns the trust property. 
 359 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 360 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 169 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
 361 See, e.g., Sankel v. Spector, 819 N.Y.S.2d 520, 524 (App. Div. 2006) (“The acceptance of 
the position . . . may be manifested in an abundance of ways, and can be expressed either orally or 
inferred from conduct.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 35 cmt. b (stating that “no particu-
lar formality is necessary to constitute an acceptance by the trustee of the fiduciary office”). 
 362 471 S.W.3d 203, 207–08 (Ark. 2015). 
 363 No. A-14-922, 2016 WL 1359097, at *8 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2016). 
 364 By requiring the settlor to give the corpus and the trust instrument to the trustee, delivery 
and the statute of frauds also dispel confusion about which assets the settlor intends to place in 
trust. In turn, this helps trustees fulfill their duty to “determin[e] exactly what property forms the 
subject-matter of the trust.” Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 
472 U.S. 559, 572 (1985) (quotation omitted); Hoenig v. Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A., 939 S.W.2d 
656, 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that “[t]he failure to discover the existence of trust property 
. . . , to make the beneficiaries aware of it, or to collect rent for its use is a conspicuous breach”). 
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liver property or obtain the trustee’s signature reduces these dangers by 
making the trustee acutely aware of her role. 
Similarly, formalism protects third parties who enter into transactions 
with a trustee. Consider the finicky rules that require settlors to title assets 
correctly, whether by deeding real estate from one trust to another or chang-
ing title on vehicles, stocks, and financial accounts. These doctrines allow 
outsiders to distinguish property that the settlor owns individually from 
property that is held in trust. Suppose a settlor executes a trust instrument 
that lists her car on Schedule A. To the rest of the world, the car still seems to 
belong to the settlor. By excluding the car from the trust until the settlor 
changes the pink slip, the law aligns ownership with external appearances.365 
At common law, this title-clarifying function was especially valuable 
for two groups: prospective purchasers of trust property and creditors. For 
these parties, dealing with a trustee was fraught with peril. Buyers needed to 
be aware of the fact that trustees sometimes did not have the power to sell 
the corpus.366 In addition, the personal creditors of the trustee could mistak-
enly attach the res instead of the trustee’s own assets. Traditionally, these 
parties bore the burden of making sure that they were not impermissibly 
acquiring trust assets and thereby participating in a breach of trust.367 Since 
these outsiders could easily stumble into liability, information about title 
had to be accurate and accessible. Trust formalism filled this need by en-
couraging settlors to distinguish the trust’s assets from their own. 
Today, however, it is no longer imperative for buyers and creditors to 
know precisely who owns a right or item. As the nature of the trustee has 
changed from a mere custodian to an active manager, the background rules 
have evolved.368 Trustees are now presumed to have vast dominion over the 
corpus, making it unlikely that they will breach the trust merely by selling 
trust assets.369 In addition, in many states, third parties no longer must en-
                                                                                                                           
 365 Admittedly, this is not true with declarations of trust, where the general rule is that the 
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gage in painstaking research to determine whether they are purchasing or 
attaching trust property.370 Both the Uniform Trust Code and the Uniform 
Trustees’ Powers Act have expanded the safe harbor of the bona fide pur-
chaser rule, restricting liability to third parties who knowingly conspire to 
breach a trust.371 Thus, forcing settlors to flag the fact that property is held 
in trust is helpful but not indispensable. 
For these reasons, courts should be able to excuse defects in the trust 
creation process under two circumstances. First, the settlor should have ex-
ecuted a signed, written instrument with a Schedule A that is broad enough 
to encompass the disputed assets (even if it does not mention them specifi-
cally). Second, the settlor’s failure to follow the formalities must not have 
jeopardized the rights of the trustee or any third party. By making the mere 
existence of the trust instrument prima facie evidence of the trust’s validity, 
harmless error would bring the law into accordance with most settlors’ ex-
pectations. In addition, this low bar would discourage litigants from filing 
challenges and would permit courts to resolve claims in a speedy, summary 
judgment-like proceeding. By making trust formalities aspirational—not 
essential—courts can honor the settlor’s intent and cap negative externali-
ties.372 
                                                                                                                           
 370 The statutes create slightly different standards, but both dilute the strict common law rules. 
See UNIF. TRUSTEES’ POWERS ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1964) (stating that “a third person, 
without actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising them, 
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tion of land.” Tolar v. Tolar, No. 12-14-00228-CV, 2015 WL 2393993, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. May 
20, 2015). Nevertheless, the court held that the bland language in Larry’s instrument sufficed even 
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Ukkestad, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 146. Second, in Carne v. Worthington, Kenneth Liebler executed a 
declaration of trust in 1985 and funded it with a tract called the Via Regla Property. 200 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2016). In 2009, Liebler made the classic mistake of trying to deed the Via 
Regla Property from himself as an individual to himself as trustee of a new trust. See id. The state 
justices ignored the fact that Liebler owned the Via Regla Property as trustee of the 1985 trust, not 
as an individual, and held that there was “clear and convincing evidence” that it belonged to the 
2009 trust. Id. at 927. It remains to be seen whether other courts in California or other jurisdictions 
will latch on to this lenient approach. 
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Admittedly, this rule would be less useful than its will-based counter-
part. When a decedent violates the Wills Act, her assets pass through intes-
tacy, which often deviates from the terms of the will.373 Conversely, many 
decedents who make trusts also execute pour-over wills that funnel assets 
back to the trust. Under the UPC and the Uniform Testamentary Additions 
to Trusts Act, a trust that is unfunded during the settlor’s life—such as a 
phantom trust—can nevertheless be resurrected after the settlor’s death by a 
pour-over will.374 Thus, harmless error would not always be required to 
save a decedent’s dispositive choices. 
Even when a settlor has taken the extra precaution of executing a pour-
over will, however, rigid trust-creation rules have pernicious effects. As 
noted, settlors make trusts largely to bypass probate. Trust formalism sends 
assets back into the court system. As the data from Alameda County reveals, 
this postpones the distribution of the settlor’s assets and adds significant 
expenses. The average number of days it took to probate a pour-over will in 
my sample was 399 days. Even worse, the mean attorneys’ and personal 
representatives’ fees was $13,090. Harmless error would achieve the same 
outcomes without these delays and costs. 
Accordingly, because trust formalities are unrelated to the settlor’s in-
tent and raise only mild externality concerns, courts should recognize a 
trust-specific harmless error rule. The next Part shifts from this new prob-
lem involving old law to terrain that is only now beginning to be uncharted. 
IV. DIGITAL ASSETS 
Most state legislatures have either just passed or are considering laws 
that govern a fiduciary’s ability to access a deceased user’s e-mail, messag-
ing, and social media accounts. This Part explores the complexities of pre-
scribing formalities in this sphere.375 
A. Dueling Statutes 
Several high-profile media stories have aroused interest in the inherit-
ability of digital assets. Some of them are tragic, such as the saga of Ricky 
and Diane Rush, whose son, Eric, was found dead from a self-inflicted 
                                                                                                                           
 373 See, e.g., Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intes-
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shotgun blast in January 2011.376 His suicide was baffling.377 Eric was a 
proverbial gentle giant, who stood six foot two and weighed 260 pounds, 
but wore thick glasses, read avidly, earned straight As, and refused to play 
football “because he didn’t want to hurt anybody.”378 As Ricky and Diane 
struggled to understand this tragedy, the police suggested that they comb 
through his recent social media activity.379 Ricky and Diane tried to log on 
to Eric’s Facebook account, but they did not know his password.380 They 
then contacted the company directly, which told them that they could not 
share Eric’s page with anyone.381 
Other news items have been farcical. In the winter of 2015, Peggy 
Bush was administering the estate of her husband, David, when she ran into 
an unexpected obstacle.382 The problem was not transferring title to their 
house or car, or obtaining access to David’s pension benefits.383 Instead, it 
was something much simpler: she was unable to continue playing a card 
game on the couple’s iPad.384 The application needed to be updated, and 
although Peggy knew the tablet’s log-on code, she had forgotten their Apple 
ID.385 When Peggy’s daughter, Donna, tried to solve the problem, the results 
made headlines. Donna provided Apple with the iPad’s serial number, Da-
vid’s death certificate, and a copy of David’s will, but Apple refused to honor 
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the request.386 Instead, as Donna recounted, she spoke to several Apple em-
ployees until she “finally got someone who said, ‘You need a court order.’”387 
One reason that internet service providers (“ISPs”) like Facebook and 
Apple are reluctant to share a deceased customer’s data is a thirty-year-old 
federal statute called the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).388 Congress 
passed the SCA in 1986 to extend Fourth Amendment-style protections 
from the physical world into cyberspace.389 Section 2702 of the statute im-
poses civil liability on ISPs that share the contents of a customer’s electron-
ic communications with third parties.390 Section 2702, however, also carves 
out an exception when a user gives her “lawful consent” to disclosure.391 
The House Report on the statute indicates that lawmakers meant “lawful 
consent” to be read broadly, encompassing both contractual assent and oth-
er, more casual forms of agreement: 
“[L]awful consent,” in this context, need not take the form of a 
formal written document of consent. A grant of consent electroni-
cally would protect the service provider from liability for disclo-
sure under Section 2702. Under various circumstances, consent 
might be inferred to have arisen from a course of dealing between 
the service provider and the customer or subscriber . . . . If condi-
tions governing disclosure or use are spelled out in the rules of an 
electronic communication service, and those rules are available to 
users or in contracts for the provision of such services, it would 
be appropriate to imply consent on the part of a user to disclo-
sures or uses consistent with those rules.392 
Yet “lawful consent” does not translate neatly into the inheritance con-
text. Can a user satisfy this benchmark in a writing that does not satisfy the 
Wills Act or the rules for making a trust? Do intestate decedents, who have 
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done nothing to make their wishes known, authorize ISPs to release their 
electronic media?393 
Compounding this confusion, some companies, such as Yahoo!, waive 
a user’s right to transmit their accounts after death in their terms of service 
(“TOS”).394 Rather than the conventional dilemma of how much formality 
is necessary to engage in testation, these fine print provisions raise the nov-
el question of how much formality is required to surrender your right to 
engage in testation. No court has addressed whether these non-inheritability 
clauses are valid.395 
In July of 2014, the ULC attempted to fill these gaps by unveiling the 
UFADDA.396 The model statute makes digital assets presumptively inherit-
able.397 For example, it dictates that decedents with no estate planning doc-
uments transmit their online assets through intestacy.398 Likewise, it deems 
testators and settlors to convey their accounts unless they state otherwise in 
their wills or trusts.399 Finally, it declares non-inheritability clauses in TOS 
to be against public policy.400 Although the UFADDA was introduced in 
twenty-seven states, it encountered fierce opposition.401 When the dust 
cleared, only Delaware and Tennessee passed the law.402 
                                                                                                                           
 393 In the late 2000s, a handful of states attempted to regulate digital inheritance. See CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5005(a)–(b) (2016); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 29-1-13-1.1 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 269 (West 2016); 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 33-27-3 (West 2016). Yet because they are prototype statutes, many of them are frustrat-
ingly cryptic about their scope and how they interface with the SCA. See, e.g., David Horton, 
Contractual Indescendibility, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1047, 1079 (2015). 
 394 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 395 Cf. Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 615 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (holding that a 
forum selection clause in a “browsewrap” TOS that also contained a non-inheritability provision 
was unenforceable for lack of assent). 
 396 See UFADDA (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
 397 Admittedly, both the UFADDA and the RUFADDA do not explicitly address the issue of 
whether digital assets are inheritable. Instead, they merely allow fiduciaries to gain control of a 
decedent’s accounts. See RUFADDA § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015); UFADDA § 7. Yet this is a 
distinction without a difference; once a fiduciary has possession of the decedent’s property, the 
law requires her to transmit it to the heirs or beneficiaries. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended 2010). 
 398 See UFADDA (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
 399 See id. §§ 4, 7. 
 400 See id. § 7(b). 
 401 See H.B. 1362, 90th Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); H.B. 15-1189, 70th Gen. As-
semb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015); H.B. 313, Gen. Assemb. (Fla. 2015); S.B. 102, Gen. Assemb. 
(Fla. 2015); H.B. 41, 28th Leg. (Haw. 2015); S.B. 467, 28th Leg. (Haw. 2015); S.B. 1055, 63rd 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2015); H.B. 4131, Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2015); S.B. 1376, Gen. Assemb. 
(Ill. 2015); S.B. 368, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015); S.B. 1238, Gen. Assemb. 
(Iowa 2015); S.B. 53, Gen. Assemb., 15th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2015); Legis. Doc. 1177, 127th Leg., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015); H.B. 531, Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2015); S.B. 429, Gen. Assemb., 2015 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015); H.B. 3422, 189th Gen. Assemb. (Mass. 2015); H.B. 200, 89th Sess. (Minn.  
592 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:539 
Then, in early 2015, NetChoice, an ISP trade association, unveiled its 
own rubric, the PEAC.403 The PEAC boasts a feature that, at first blush, 
seems to pave the way for digital inheritance: it permits decedents to articu-
late their intent through an “online tool.”404 Companies like Google and 
Facebook have introduced features that allow users to specify that someone 
else should be able to access their media after a set period of inactivity,405 
and the PEAC ratifies these choices. 
 
Google’s Inactive Accounts Manager 
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In other respects, though, the PEAC is more restrictive. For one, it 
flips the UFADDA’s default by prohibiting online assets from passing via 
intestacy.406 In addition, the PEAC only validates instructions in wills, not 
trusts.407 Finally, unlike the UFADDA, the PEAC does not mention non-
inheritability provisions in TOS, thus making their status a pure matter of 
contract law. Backed by the tech sector’s lobbying firepower, the PEAC 
became law in Virginia and marched through the legislative process in Cali-
fornia and Oregon.408 
Then, in July 2015, the ULC revised the UFADAA (“RUFADDA”).409 
The amended statute borrows two components from the PEAC. First, it ex-
empts digital assets from intestacy.410 Second, it allows users to consent to 
the posthumous disclosure of their electronic property through an “online 
tool.”411 Here, however, is where the similarities end. The RUFADDA con-
tinues the UFADDA’s hostility to non-inheritability clauses, stating that a us-
er’s estate plan “overrides a contrary provision in a terms-of-service agree-
ment.”412 Moreover, the RUFADDA casts a much wider net than the PEAC in 
its hunt for a decedent’s intent. It states that users can make their desires 
known in several ways: “a will, trust . . . or other record.”413 The statute de-
fines “record” expansively, to include “information that . . . is stored in an 
electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”414 
B. Formalism as a Clear Statement Rule 
Digital assets pose novel challenges for lawmakers. This section ar-
gues that the most elegant solution to these problems is to create a sticky 
default rule that requires users to unmistakably indicate that they want to 
transmit their electronic property after they die.415 It then uses that yardstick 
to critique the UFADDA, the PEAC, and the RUFADDA.416 
Online accounts are unlike most other forms of property. We assume 
that everyone wants to convey their land, stocks, cash, and heirlooms to 
someone else after death, but the same does not necessarily hold for digital 
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assets.417 E-mails and social media accounts contain a trove of private in-
formation, from confidential communications to dating profiles to health 
data.418 Indeed, as one writer puts it, we can all “think of at least one e-mail 
that we would not want to fall into the wrong hands.”419 To be sure, there 
are some advantages of allowing fiduciaries to step into a decedent’s shoes. 
Given the prevalence of online banking and bill pay, handing the keys to a 
decedent’s inbox to her trustee or personal representative can streamline 
estate administration.420 Moreover, photographs and videos that are stored 
on the Internet may have tremendous sentimental value. Nevertheless, even 
with these upsides, some owners—perhaps even most owners—would pre-
fer to have their online media die along with them.421 
Allowing the posthumous transfer of digital assets also burdens third 
parties. For one, ISPs must bear the expense and hassle of responding to 
demands to transfer a dead user’s accounts. Any such regime must include 
safeguards against fraudulent requests that could be used for identity theft 
or other nefarious purposes. In a similar vein, ISPs must contend with the 
specter of liability under the SCA.422 Because the relationship between fed-
eral and state law in this sphere is uncertain and evolving, ISPs probably 
need to err on the side of caution and only disclose a decedent’s messages 
when there can be little doubt that she has given her “lawful consent.” Fi-
nally, descendible digital assets can violate the privacy of other people. In-
deed, e-mail inboxes do not just capture a decedent’s words—they are over-
flowing with dispatches from her friends, family, lovers, co-workers, ac-
quaintances, employers, psychologists, doctors, lawyers, and religious lead-
ers. Likewise, social media accounts often display live updates from other 
people’s accounts.423 Because chats and text messages occur in real time, 
transcripts of these conversations are a futuristic form of eavesdropping. 
For these reasons, spillover costs are endemic in digital inheritance. 
Thus, in this unique context, formalities need to do quadruple duty. 
First, formalities have to clarify whether a decedent even wants to convey 
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her electronic property to anyone. Second, formalities must allow judges to 
determine whether a purported transfer of electronic property is authentic. 
Third, formalities need to perform the same function for ISPs, which, like 
private probate courts, will be called upon to distinguish a legitimate ex-
pression of a decedent’s intent from a false one. And fourth, to the extent 
possible, formalities should try to limit negative externalities. 
Although there is no perfect way to balance these concerns, the best 
tactic is probably to presume that electronic property is not inheritable un-
less a decedent unambiguously states otherwise. This regime would make it 
easier to identify individuals who actually want to pass their online ac-
counts to their loved ones. It would also allow courts and ISPs to divine a 
decedent’s wishes and for ISPs to ensure that a decedent has lawfully con-
sented to the release of her online assets. Finally, although it would not 
solve the problem of third party privacy, it would at least contain this harm 
by limiting the volume of digital inheritance. These factors point to impos-
ing a clear statement rule, such as requiring a provision in an instrument 
that directly addresses digital assets.424 
This lens is helpful for assessing the UFADDA, the PEAC, and the 
RUFADDA. For instance, it highlights the fatal mistake of the UFADDA. 
The ULC’s first draft insisted on treating electronic accounts like all other 
valuable rights and items by making them transmissible by will, trust, or 
intestacy. It therefore ignored the reality that many users may not want to 
transfer digital assets as well as the risk of harming third parties. By com-
parison, the PEAC and the RUFADDA share the common thread of exempt-
ing online assets from intestacy. This is the crudest form of clear statement 
rule: it predicates electronic inheritance on a user engaging in some form of 
estate planning. Because it puts the onus on decedents to signal their desire 
to transmit their online accounts, though, it is a step in the right direction. 
The PEAC then adds an additional wrinkle. The ISP-sponsored statute 
allows wills, but not trusts, to convey digital assets.425 This exclusion is a 
shining example of how the policy objective of limiting externalities can 
sometimes trump a decedent’s intent in this niche. It flows from the fact that 
trusts are private, and ISPs want the protections of full-fledged probate. By 
opting back into the court system, these companies obtain the extra safe-
guard of an authoritative ruling that a decedent’s will is valid and that she 
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has lawfully consented under the SCA.426 Yet it achieves this result by run-
ning roughshod over individual intent. No matter how fervent a settlor’s 
wish that she passes her email or social media accounts to her friends or 
family, she cannot do so if she selects the wrong dispositive mechanism 
(which happens to also be the most common dispositive mechanism). 
As a normative matter, the PEAC probably goes too far with its wood-
en distinction between wills and trusts. From a decedent’s perspective, this 
sharp divide is the very definition of arbitrary. In addition, ISPs enjoy other 
ways of insuring against liability and minimizing transaction costs. The 
PEAC requires estates to indemnify ISPs to reduce the danger of them be-
ing on the hook for damages under the SCA.427 The statute also permits 
courts to deny a request for digital assets if it would cause an “undue bur-
den” to ISPs.428 In any event, ISPs can either pass on their additional ex-
penses to their customers or experiment with non-inheritability provisions 
in their TOS. Finally, even though the PEAC may limit some spillover 
costs, it also creates new ones. By making courts the intermediaries for digi-
tal succession, it might increase the strain on the judiciary. 
On the flip side, the RUFADDA does not take formalism far enough. 
To be sure, it is superior to the PEAC because it affords the same dignity to 
wills and trusts. As noted, though, the RUFADDA does not stop there; in-
deed, it covers expressions of intent in “record[s]” that include “electronic 
or other medium[s].”429 In fact, the statute does not mandate that this “rec-
ord” be signed. The RUFADDA thus creates the possibility of a user ex-
pressing her wishes in an unadorned word processing document or on Twit-
ter.430 In fact, one jurisdiction, Wisconsin, allows a user to consent to the 
disclosure of her digital assets in an “inter vivos governing instrument,” 
which can be a “gift that is not subject to a written instrument.”431 Appar-
ently, then, in the Badger State, users may bequeath digital assets orally. 
Even more importantly, the RUFADDA does not require testators and 
settlors to expressly address digital assets in order to convey them.432 Virtu-
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ally all testamentary instruments contain a residuary clause: a safety net that 
covers the “rest, remainder, and residue” of the estate and thereby transmits 
any property that the decedent has not already given away.433 Courts inter-
pret residuary clauses as broadly as possible.434 As a result, under the 
RUFADDA, a conventional residuary clause that does not mention the de-
cedent’s electronic accounts may very well allow disclosure.435 This would 
dramatically expand the scope of the statute by effectively permitting all 
wills and trusts to transmit digital assets. 
These informal aspects of the RUFADDA are misguided for several 
reasons. They could allow heirs and beneficiaries to acquire online posses-
sions even when decedents would have preferred not to hand them over. 
They might breed litigation over sketchy writings or the meaning of a “plain 
vanilla” residuary clause.436 They make it harder for ISPs to know that a 
decedent has lawfully consented under the SCA.437 And they do nothing to 
address the dangers to third party privacy that inheritable email and social 
media accounts pose. By amending the statute to require decedents to spe-
cifically authorize fiduciary access, lawmakers could harness the power of 
formalism to assuage these concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
The Wills Act and its related non-probate principles are steeped in tra-
dition. Nonetheless, computers, smartphones, the Internet, and the mass use 
of trusts have either already changed or stand poised to change the way we 
express our last wishes. These innovations have created fresh questions 
about the role of formalism in the creation of a dispositive instrument. 
The dominant way of thinking about these issues is the intent para-
digm: the idea that bright-line rules create a kind of force field around au-
thentic testamentary instruments. Rather than this blinkered focus on the 
wishes of individual property, owners, courts, scholars, and lawmakers 
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should pay greater attention to the way in which inflexible rules prevent 
decedents from harming third parties. Recognizing this anti-externality 
function can help us plot a course through formalism’s frontiers. 
